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Abstract
A deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agent observes its states through observations, which
may contain natural measurement errors or adversarial noises. Since the observations deviate
from the true states, they can mislead the agent into making suboptimal actions. Several works
have shown this vulnerability via adversarial attacks, but how to improve the robustness of DRL
under this setting has not been well studied. We show that naively applying existing techniques on
improving robustness for classification tasks, like adversarial training, are ineffective for many
RL tasks. We propose the state-adversarial Markov decision process (SA-MDP) to study the
fundamental properties of this problem, and develop a theoretically principled policy regularization
which can be applied to a large family of DRL algorithms, including proximal policy optimization
(PPO), deep deterministic policy gradient (DDPG) and deep Q networks (DQN), for both discrete
and continuous action control problems. We significantly improve the robustness of PPO, DDPG
and DQN agents under a suite of strong white box adversarial attacks, including new attacks of
our own. Additionally, we find that a robust policy noticeably improves DRL performance even
without an adversary in a number of environments.
1 Introduction
With deep neural networks (DNNs) as powerful function approximators, deep reinforcement learning
(DRL) has achieved great success on many complex tasks [39, 29, 27, 56, 16] and even on some
safety-critical applications (e.g., autonomous driving [64, 49, 42]). Despite achieving super-human
level performance on many tasks, the existence of adversarial examples [59] in DNNs and many
successful attacks to DRL [21, 2, 30, 43, 70] motivates us to study robust DRL algorithms.
When an RL agent obtains its current state via observations, the observations may contain uncertainty
that naturally originates from unavoidable sensor errors or equipment inaccuracy. A policy not robust
to such uncertainty can lead to catastrophic failures (Figure 1). To ensure safety under the worst case
uncertainty, in our paper we consider the adversarial setting where the observation is adversarially
perturbed from s to ν(s), yet the underlying true environment state s where the agent locates is
unchanged. This setting is aligned with many adversarial attacks on state observations (e.g., [21, 30]).
To improve robustness under this setting, a natural approach is to extend existing adversarial defenses
for supervised learning, e.g., adversarial training [26, 33, 76] to DRL. Specifically, we can attack
the agent and generate trajectories adversarially during training time, and apply any existing DRL
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Figure 1: A car observes its location through sen-
sors (e.g., GPS) and plans its route to the goal.
Without considering the uncertainty in observed
location (e.g., error of GPS coordinates), an un-
safe policy may crash into the wall because the
observed location and true location differ.
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Figure 2: Box plots of rewards over 100 episodes
on four Mujoco environments. Even in natural
environments without an adversary, the minimum
rewards DDPG agents receive can be much lower
than the median. Our robust SA-DDPG agents
obtain much better worst case performance.
algorithm to hopefully obtain a robust policy. Unfortunately, we show that for most environments,
naive adversarial training can make training unstable and deteriorate agent performance (a similar
observation is made in [3, 11]), or does not significantly improve robustness under strong attacks.
Since RL and supervised learning are quite different problems, naively applying techniques from
supervised learning to RL without a proper theoretical justification can be unsuccessful.
Additionally, DRL agents can be brittle even without any adversarial attacks – an agent may fail
occasionally but catastrophically during regular (non-adversarial) rollouts, and debugging these
failure cases can be quite challenging [62]. In Figure 2 we show a few DDPG agents achieving high
median rewards. However, during 100 episodes (each episode is randomly initialized with a small
noise added in OpenAI Gym) we observe occasional low reward runs. In practical applications, such
a small noise can be naturally prevalent and thus prohibits the use of DRL in safety critical domains
like autonomous driving. The agents trained using our proposed robust policy optimization objective
(SA-DDPG) can obtain significantly better worst case reward with much less variance. To summarize,
our paper studies the theory and practice of robust RL against perturbations on state observations:
• We formulate the perturbation on state observations as a modified Markov decision process (MDP),
which we call state-adversarial MDP (SA-MDP), and study its fundamental properties. We show that
under an optimal adversary, a stationary and Markov optimal policy may not exist for SA-MDP.
• Based on our theory of SA-MDP, we propose a theoretically principled robust policy regularizer
which is related to the total variation distance or KL-divergence on perturbed policies. It can be
practically and efficiently applied to a wide range of RL algorithms, including PPO, DDPG and DQN.
• We conduct experiments on 11 environments ranging from Atari games with discrete actions
to complex robotic control tasks in continuous action space. Our proposed method significantly
improves robustness under strong white-box attacks on state observations, including two new attacks
we design, the robust SARSA attack (RS attack) and maximal action difference attack (MAD attack).
2 Related Work
Robust Reinforcement Learning Since each element of RL (observations, actions, transition
dynamics and rewards) can contain uncertainty, robust RL has been studied from different perspectives.
Robust Markov decision process (RMDP) [23, 40] considers the worst case perturbation from
transition probabilities, and has been extended to distributional settings [71] and partially observed
MDPs [41]. The agent observes the original true state from the environment and acts accordingly, but
the environment can choose from a set of transition probabilities that minimizes rewards. RMDP
theory has inspired robust deep Q-learning [55] and policy gradient algorithms [35, 8, 36] that are
robust against small environment changes (e.g., changes in physical parameters like mass and length).
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Several works [44, 28] consider the adversarial setting of multi-agent reinforcement learning [60, 5].
In the simplest two-player setting (referred to as minimax games in [31]), each agent chooses an
action at each step, and the environment transits based on both actions. The regularQ functionQ(s, a)
can be extended to Q(S, a, o) where o is the opponent’s action and Q-learning is still convergent.
This setting can be extended to deep Q learning and policy gradient algorithms [28, 44]. Pinto et al.
[44] show that learning an opponent agent simultaneously can improve the agent’s performance as
well as its robustness against environment turbulence and test conditions (e.g., change in mass or
friction). Gu et al. [17] carried out real-world experiments on the two-player adversarial learning
game. Additionally, Tessler et al. [61] considered adversarial perturbations on the action space. Fu
et al. [12] investigated how to learn a robust reward. All these settings are different from ours, as we
only manipulate the observations but do not change the underlying environment or actions directly.
Adversarial Attacks on State Observations in DRL Huang et al. [21] evaluate the robustness of
deep reinforcement learning policies through an FGSM based attack on Atari games with discrete
actions. Kos & Song [25] proposed to use the value function to guide adversarial perturbation search.
Lin et al. [30] considered a more complicated case where the adversary is allowed to only attack
at a subset of time steps, and used a generative model to generate attack plans luring the agent to
a designated target state. Behzadan & Munir [2] studied black-box attacks on DQN with discrete
action space via transferability of adversarial examples. Pattanaik et al. [43] further enhanced attacks
with multi-step gradient descent and better engineered loss functions. We refer the reader to recent
surveys [70, 22] for a taxonomy and a comprehensive list of adversarial attacks in DRL.
Improving Robustness for State Observations in DRL For discrete action RL tasks, Kos & Song
[25] first presented preliminary results of adversarial training on Pong (one of the simplest Atari
environments) using weak FGSM attacks on pixel space. Behzadan & Munir [3] applied adversarial
training to several Atari games with DQN, and found it challenging for the agent to adapt to the attacks
during training time – one must attack only a portion of frames, and even then the agent performance
still suffers under test time attacks. For Pong, adversarial training can improve reward under attack
from −21 (lowest) to −5, yet is still far away from the optimal reward (+21). To obtain better
performance, Mirman et al. [37], Fischer et al. [11] treat the discrete action outputs of DQN as labels,
and apply existing certified defense for classification [38] to robustly predict actions using imitation
learning. This approach outperforms [3], but it is unclear how to apply it to environments with
continuous action spaces. For continuous action RL tasks (e.g., Mujoco environments), Mandlekar
et al. [34] used a weak FGSM based attack with policy gradient to adversarially train a few simple RL
tasks. Pattanaik et al. [43] used stronger multi-step gradient based attacks; however, their evaluation
focused on robustness against environment changes rather than state perturbations. We show that
adversarial training does not reliably improve test time performance under strong attacks in Section 4.
Other related works include [19], which proposed a meta online learning procedure with a master
agent detecting the presence of the adversary and switching between a few sub-policies, but did not
discuss how to train a single agent robustly. [7] applied adversarial training specifically for RL-based
path-finding algorithms. Lütjens et al. [32] considered the worst-case scenario during rollouts for
an existing DQN agents to ensure safety, but it relies on an existing policy and does not include a
training procedure. Robust DRL for perturbations on state observations, especially for continuous
action space tasks, is largely unsolved and existing approaches lack proper theoretical justifications.
3 Methodology
3.1 State-Adversarial Markov Decision Process
A Markov decision process (MDP) is defined as a 4-tuple, (S,A, R, p), where S is the state space, A
is the action space, R : S×A×S → R is the reward function, and p : S×A → P(S) represents the
transition probability of environment, where P(S) defines the set of all possible probability measures
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on S. The transition probability is p(s′|s, a) = Pr(st+1 = s′|st = s, at = a), where t is the time
step. We denote a stationary policy as pi : S → P(A), the set of all stochastic and Markovian
policies as ΠMR, the set of all deterministic and Markovian policies as ΠMD, and the discount factor
as 0 < γ < 1.
st+1
Agent
Environment
rt+1
rt
ν(st)
st
adversary
at ~ π(a⏐ν(st))
Figure 3: Reinforcement learning with
perturbed state observations. The agent
observes a perturbed state ν(st) rather
than the true environment state st.
In state-adversarial MDP (SA-MDP), we introduce an
adversary ν(s) : S → S. The adversary only perturbs
the observation of the agent, such that the action is taken
as pi(a|ν(s)), but the environment still transits from state
s rather than ν(s) to the next state. Since ν(s) can be
different from s, the agent’s action from pi(a|ν(s)) may
be sub-optimal, and thus the adversary is able to reduce
the reward. In a real world RL problem, the adversary
can be reflected as the worst case noise in measurement
or state estimation uncertainty. Note that this scenario is
different from the two-player Markov game [31] where
both players interact with the environment directly and the
opponent can change the state of the game.
To allow a formal analysis, we make the following assumptions for the adversary ν:
Assumption 1 (Stationary, Deterministic and Markovian Adversary). ν(s) is a deterministic function
ν : S → S which only depends on the current state s, and ν does not change over time.
This assumption holds for many adversarial attacks [21, 30, 25, 43]. These attacks only depend on
the current state input and the policy or Q network so they are Markovian; the network parameters are
frozen at test time, so given the same s the adversary will generate the same (stationary) perturbation.
We leave the formal analysis of non-Markovian, non-stationary adversaries as future work.
Assumption 2 (Bounded Adversary Power). ν(s) ∈ B(s) whereB(s) is a set of states and s ∈ B(s).
Assumption 2 restricts the adversary to perturb a state s only to a predefined set of states B(s). B(s)
is usually a set of task-specific “neighbouring” states of s (e.g., bounded sensor measurement errors),
which makes the observation still meaningful (yet not accurate) even with perturbations.
The definitions of adversarial value and action-value functions under ν is similar to those of regular
MDP:
V˜ piν (s) = Epi◦ν
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1|st = s
]
, Q˜piν (s, a) = Epi◦ν
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1|st = s, at = a
]
,
where the reward at step-t is defined as rt and pi◦ν denotes the policy under observation perturbations:
pi(a|ν(s)). Based on these two assumptions, we state our theorems for the state-adversarial Markov
decision process. The proofs of our theorems are provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 (Bellman equations for fixed pi and ν). Given pi : S → P(A) and ν : S → S , we have
V˜ piν (s) =
∑
a∈A
pi(a|ν(s))
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γV˜ piν (s
′)
]
Q˜piν (s, a) =
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γ
∑
a′∈A
pi(a′|ν(s′))Q˜piν (s′, a′)
]
.
We first consider the optimal adversary ν∗(pi) that minimizes the total expected reward for a given pi,
and define the optimal adversarial value and action-value functions:
V˜ piν∗(s) = min
ν
V˜ piν (s), Q˜
pi
ν∗(s, a) = min
ν
Q˜piν (s, a).
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Theorem 2 (Bellman contraction for optimal adversary). Define Bellman operatorL : R|S| → R|S|,
(LV˜ pi)(s) = min
sν∈B(s)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|sν)
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γV˜ pi(s′)
]
. (1)
The Bellman equation for optimal adversary ν∗ can be written as: V˜ piν∗ = LV˜
pi
ν∗ . Additionally,L is
a contraction that converges to V˜ piν∗ .
Based on Theorem 2 we have a policy evaluation algorithm for SA-MDP (Algorithm 1 in Appendix B),
that computes V piν∗(s) for each s ∈ S . Given pi, value functions for MDP and SA-MDP can be vastly
different; Appendix A includes an example where its optimal MDP policy has 0 reward in SA-MDP.
Following the known results in MDP, we hope to find an optimal policy pi∗ for SA-MDP such that
V˜ pi
∗
ν∗(pi∗)(s) ≥ V˜ piν∗(pi)(s) for ∀s ∈ S and ∀pi. (2)
where the subscript ν∗(pi) explicitly indicates that ν∗ is the optimal adversary for pi. Unfortunately,
we show the following surprising negative results in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4:
Theorem 3. There exists an SA-MDP and some stochastic policy pi ∈ ΠMR such that we cannot find
a better deterministic policy pi′ ∈ ΠMD satisfying V˜ pi′ν∗(pi′)(s) ≥ V˜ piν∗(pi)(s) for all s ∈ S.
Contrarily, in classical MDP, for any stochastic policy we can find a deterministic policy that is at
least as good as the stochastic one. With an optimal adversary in SA-MDP, it does not hold anymore.
Theorem 4. Under the optimal ν∗, an optimal policy pi∗ ∈ ΠMR does not always exist for SA-MDP.
The optimal policy pi∗ requires to have V˜ pi
∗
ν∗(pi∗)(s) ≥ V˜ piν∗(pi)(s) for all s and any pi. In an SA-MDP,
surprisingly, sometimes we have to make a trade-off between the value of two states and there is no
policy that can maximize the values of all states simultaneously (see Appendix A). However, not all
hopes are lost and we show that under certain assumptions, the loss in performance can be bounded:
Theorem 5. Given a policy pi for a non-adversarial MDP. Under the optimal adversary ν in SA-MDP,
for all s ∈ S we have
max
s∈S
{
V pi(s)− V˜ piν∗(s)
} ≤ αmax
s∈S
max
sˆ∈B(s)
DTV(pi(·|s), pi(·|sˆ)) (3)
where DTV(pi(·|s), pi(·|sˆ)) is the total variation distance between pi(·|s) and pi(·|sˆ), and α :=
2[1 + γ(1−γ)2 ] max(s,a,s′)∈S×A×S |R(s, a, s′)| is a constant that does not depend on pi.
Theorem 5 shows that as long as DTV(pi(a|s), pi(a|sˆ)) is not too large for any sˆ ∈ B(s) (within the
power of adversary), the performance gap between V˜ piν∗(s) (SA-MDP) and V
pi(s) (regular MDP) can
be bounded. This motivates us to regularize DTV(pi(·|s), pi(·|sˆ)) during training to obtain a policy
that is robust under strong adversaries. We now study a few practical DRL algorithms below.
3.2 State-Adversarial DRL for Stochastic Policies: A Case Study on PPO
We start with the most general case where the policy pi(a|s) is stochastic (e.g., in PPO [52]). The
total variation distance is not easy to compute for most distributions, so we upper bound it again by
KL divergence: DTV(pi(a|s), pi(a|sˆ)) ≤ (DKL(pi(a|s)‖pi(a|sˆ)))2. When Gaussian policies are used,
we denote pi(a|s) ∼ N (µs,Σs) and pi(a|sˆ) ∼ N (µsˆ,Σsˆ). Their KL-divergence can be given as:
DKL(pi(a|s)‖pi(a|sˆ)) = 1
2
(
log |ΣsˆΣ−1s |+ tr(Σ−1sˆ Σs) + (µsˆ − µs)>Σ−1sˆ (µsˆ − µs)− |A|
)
. (4)
Regularizing KL distance (4) for all sˆ ∈ B(s) will lead to a smaller upper bound in (3), which is
directly related to agent performance under optimal adversary. In PPO, the mean terms µs, µsˆ are
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produced by neural networks: µθµ(s) and µθµ(sˆ), and Σ is a diagonal matrix independent of state s
(i.e., Σsˆ = Σs = Σ), so regularizing the above KL-divergence over all s from sampled trajectories
and all sˆ ∈ B(s) leads to the following robust policy regularizer for PPO, ignoring constant terms:
RPPO(θµ) = 1
2
∑
s
max
sˆ∈B(s)
(
µθµ(sˆ)− µθµ(s)
)>
Σ−1
(
µθµ(sˆ)− µθµ(s)
)
:=
1
2
∑
s
max
sˆ∈B(s)
Rs(sˆ, θµ). (5)
We replace maxs∈S term in (3) with a more practical and optimizer-friendly summation over all
states in sampled trajectory. A similar treatment was used in TRPO [27] which was also derived as
a KL-based regularizer, albeit on θµ space rather than on state space. However, minimizing (5) is
challenging as it is a minimax objective, and we also have ∇sˆR(sˆ, θµ)|sˆ=s = 0 so using gradient
descent directly cannot solve the inner maximization problem to a local maximum. Instead of using
the more expensive second order methods, we propose the following two approaches to solve (5).
Solving the robust policy regularizer using SGLD. Stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics
(SGLD) [14] can escape saddle points and shallow local optima in non-convex optimization prob-
lems [47, 78, 6, 73], and can be used to solve the inner maximization with zero gradient at sˆ = s.
SGLD uses the following update rule to find sˆK to maximizeRs(sˆ, θµ):
sˆk+1 ← proj
(
sˆk − ηk∇sˆkRs(sˆk, θµ) +
√
2ηk/βkξ
)
, sˆ1 = s, k = 1, · · · ,K
where ηk is step size, ξ is an i.i.d. standard Gaussian random variable in R|S|, βk is an inverse
temperature hyperparameter, and proj(·) projects the update back into B(s). We find that SGLD is
sufficient to escape the stationary point at sˆ = s. However, due to the non-convexity of µθµ(sˆ, θµ),
this approach only provides a lower bound Rs(sˆK , θµ) of maxsˆ∈B(s)Rs(sˆ, θµ). Minimizing this
lower bound does not guarantee to minimize (5), as the gap between maxsˆ∈B(s)Rs(sˆ, θµ) and
Rs(sˆK , θµ) can be large.
Solving the robust policy regularizer using convex relaxations. Convex relaxation of non-linear
units in neuron networks enables an efficient analysis of the outer bounds for a neural network [68,
75, 57, 9, 67, 66, 50, 58] (more background given in Appendix D). Several works have used it for
certified adversarial defenses [69, 38, 65, 77], but here we use it as a generic optimization tool for
solving minimax functions involving neural networks. Using this technique, we can obtain an upper
bound forRs(sˆ, θµ): Rs(θµ) ≥ Rs(sˆ, θµ) for all sˆ ∈ B(s). Rs(θµ) is also a function of θµ and can
be efficiently computed and optimized. We can then solve the following minimization problem:
min
θµ
1
2
∑
s
Rs(θµ) ≥ min
θµ
1
2
∑
s
max
sˆ∈B(s)
Rs(sˆ, θµ) = min
θµ
RPPO(θµ).
Since we minimize an upper bound of the inner max, the original objective (5) is guaranteed to be
minimized. Using convex relaxations can also provide certain robustness certificates for DRL as a
bonus (e.g., we can guarantee an action has bounded changes under bounded perturbations), discussed
in Appendix E. We use auto_LiRPA, an efficient and automatic tool [72], to giveRs(θµ).
Once the inner maximization problem is solved, we can addRPPO as part of the policy optimization
objective, and solve PPO using SGD as usual. We show our full SA-PPO algorithm in Appendix F.
3.3 State-Adversarial DRL for Deterministic Policies: A Case Study on DDPG
DDPG learns a deterministic policy pi(s) ∈ R|A|, and in this situation, the total variation distance
DTV (pi(·|s), pi(·|sˆ)) is malformed, as the densities at different states s and sˆ are very likely to be
completely non-overlapping. To address this issue, we define a smoothed version of policy, p¯i(a|s)
in DDPG, where we add independent Gaussian noise with variance σ2 to each action: p¯i(a|s) ∼
N (pi(s), σ2I|A|). Then we can compute DTV (p¯i(·|s), p¯i(·|sˆ)) using the following theorem:
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Theorem 6. DTV (p¯i(·|s), p¯i(·|sˆ)) =
√
2/pi dσ +O(d
3), where d = ‖pi(s)− pi(sˆ)‖2.
Thus, as long as we can penalize
√
2/pi dσ , the total variation distance between the two smoothed
distributions can be bounded. In DDPG, we parameterize the policy as a policy network piθpi . Based
on Theorem 5, the robust policy regularizer for DDPG is:
RDDPG(θpi) =
√
2/pi(1/σ)
∑
s
max
sˆ∈B(s)
‖piθpi (s)− piθpi (sˆ)‖2 (6)
for each state s in a sampled batch of states, we need to solve a maximization problem, which can be
done using SGLD or convex relaxations similarly as we have shown in Section 3.2. Note that the
smoothing procedure can be done completely at test time, and during training time our goal is to keep
maxsˆ∈B(s) ‖piθpi (s)− piθpi (sˆ)‖2 small. We show the full SA-DDPG algorithm in Appendix G.
3.4 State-Adversarial DRL for Q Learning: A Case Study on DQN
The action space for DQN is finite, and the deterministic action is determined by the max Q value:
pi(a|s) = 1 when a = arg maxa′ Q(s, a′) and 0 otherwise. The total variation distance in this case is
DTV (pi(·|s), pi(·|sˆ)) =
{
0 arg maxa pi(a|s) = arg maxa pi(a|sˆ)
1 otherwise.
Thus, we want to make the top-1 action stay unchanged after perturbation, and we use a hinge-like
robust policy regularizer, where a∗(s) = arg maxaQθ(s, a) and c is a small positive constant:
RDQN(θ) :=
∑
s
max{ max
sˆ∈B(s)
max
a6=a∗
Qθ(sˆ, a)−Qθ(sˆ, a∗(s)),−c}. (7)
The sum is over all s in a sampled batch. Unlike PPO and DDPG, it is more similar to the robustness
of classification tasks, if we treat a∗(s) as the “correct” label. The maximization can be solved using
projected gradient descent (PGD) or convex relaxation of neural networks. Due to its similarity to
classification, we defer the details on solvingRDQN(θ) and full SA-DQN algorithm to Appendix H.
3.5 Robustness Evaluation via Adversarial Attacks under Assumption 1
In this section and Appendix C we discuss a few strong adversarial attacks under Assumption 1.
For policy gradient and actor-critic based RL algorithms, Pattanaik et al. [43] and many follow-on
works use the gradient of Q(s, a) to provide the direction to update states adversarially in K steps:
sk+1 = sk − η · proj [∇skQ(s0, pi(sk))] , k = 0, . . . ,K − 1, and define sˆ := sK−1. (8)
Here proj[·] is a projection to B(s), η is the learning rate, and s0 is the state under attack. It attempts
to find a state sˆ triggering an action pi(sˆ) minimizing the action-value at state s0. The formulation
in [43] has a glitch that the gradient is evaluated as∇skQ(sk, pi(sk)) rather than∇skQ(s0, pi(sk)).
We found that the corrected form (8) is more successful. If Q is a perfect action-value function, sˆ
leads to the worst action that minimizes the value at s0. However, this attack has a few drawbacks:
• Attack strength strongly depends on critic quality; if Q is poorly learned, is not robust against small
perturbations or has obfuscated gradients, the attack fails as no correct update direction is given.
• It relies on the Q function which is specific to the training process, but not used during roll-out.
• Not applicable to many actor-critic methods (e.g., TRPO and PPO) using a learned value function
V (s) instead of Q(s, a). Finding sˆ ∈ B(s) minimizing V (s) does not correctly reflect the setting of
perturbing observations, as V (sˆ) represents the value of sˆ rather than the value of taking pi(sˆ) at s0.
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When we evaluate the robustness of a policy, we desire it to be independent of a specific critic network
to avoid these problems. We thus propose two novel critic independent attacks for DDPG and PPO.
Robust SARSA (RS) attack. Since pi is fixed during evaluation, we can learn its corresponding
Qpi(s, a) using on-policy temporal-difference algorithms without knowing the critic network used
during training. Additionally, we find that the robustness of Qpi(s, a) is very important; if Qpi(s, a) is
not robust against small perturbations (e.g., given a state s0, a small change in a will significantly
reduce Qpi(s0, a) which does not reflect the true action-value), it cannot provide a good direction for
attacks. Based on these, we use the on-policy TD-learning algorithm, SARSA [48], to learn Qpi(s, a)
(parameterized as an NN with parameters θ) with an additional robustness objective to minimize:
LRS(θ) =
∑
i∈[N ]
[
ri + γQ
pi
RS(s
′
i, a
′
i)−QpiRS(si, ai)
]2
+ λRS
∑
i∈[N ]
max
aˆ∈B(ai)
(QpiRS(si, aˆ)−QpiRS(si, ai))2.
N is the batch size and each batch containsN tuples of transitions (s, a, r, s′, a′) sampled from agent
rollouts. The first summation is the TD-loss and the second summation is the robustness penalty with
regularization λRS . B(ai) is a small set near action ai (e.g., a `∞ ball of norm 0.05 when action is
normalized between 0 to 1). The inner maximization can be solved using convex relaxation of neural
networks as we have done in Section 3.3. Then, we use QpiθRS to perform critic-based attacks as in (8).
This attack sometimes significantly outperforms the attack using the critic trained along with the
policy network, as its attack strength does not depend on the quality of an existing critic. We give the
detailed procedure for RS attack and show the importance of the robust objective in appendix C.
Maximal Action Difference (MAD) attack. We propose another simple yet very effective attack
which does not depend on a critic. Following our Theorem 5 and 6, we can find an adversarial
state sˆ by maximizing DKL (pi(·|s)‖pi(·|sˆ)). For actions parameterized by Gaussian mean piθpi (s) and
covariance matrix Σ (independent of s), we minimize LMAD(sˆ) := −DKL (pi(·|s)‖pi(·|sˆ)) to find sˆ:
arg min
sˆ∈B(s)
LMAD(sˆ) = arg max
sˆ∈B(s)
DKL(pi(·|s)‖pi(·|sˆ)) = arg max
sˆ∈B(s)
(piθpi (s)− piθpi (sˆ))> Σ−1 (piθpi (s)− piθpi (sˆ))
For DDPG we can simply set Σ = I . The objective can be optimized using SGLD to find a good sˆ.
4 Experiments
In our experiments, the set of adversarial states B(s) is defined as an `∞ norm ball around s with
a radius : B(s) := {sˆ : ‖s − sˆ‖∞ ≤ }. Here  is also referred to as the perturbation budget.
In some environments, the `∞ norm is applied on normalized state representations. Our reference
implementation for SA-PPO, SA-DDPG and SA-DQN is available at https://github.com/
chenhongge/StateAdvDRL.
Evaluation of SA-PPO We use the PPO implementation from [10], which conducted hyperparam-
eter search and published the optimal hyperparameters for PPO on three Mujoco environments in
OpenAI Gym [4]. We use their optimal hyperparameters for PPO, and the same set of hyperparame-
ters for SA-PPO without further tuning. We run Walker2d and Hopper 2× 106 steps and Humanoid
1× 107 steps to ensure convergence. Our PPO baselines achieve similar or better performance than
reported in the literature [10, 20, 18]. Detailed hyperparameters are in Appendix F. SA-PPO has
one additional regularization parameter, κPPO, for the regularizer RPPO, which is chosen in {0.01,
0.03, 0.1, 0.3, 1.0}. The perturbation  is added into the normalized state space as `∞ noise. We
include three baselines: vanilla PPO, and adversarially trained PPO [34, 43] with 50% and 100%
training steps under critic attack [43]. The attack has to be conducted on V (s) instead of Q(s, a), as
PPO does not learn a Q function during learning. We report SA-PPO objective solved using both
SGLD and convex relaxation methods. We use five attacks detailed in Sec. 3.5 and Appendix C.
In Table 1, we observe that adversarial training deteriorates performance and does not reliably
improve robustness in all three environments. Our RS attack and MAD attacks are very effective in
all environments and achieve significantly lower rewards than critic and random attacks; this shows
the importance of evaluation using strong attacks. SA-PPO, solved either by SGLD or the convex
relaxation objective, significantly improves robustness against strong attacks. Additionally, SA-PPO
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(b) Rewards under the best (strongest) attacks
Figure 4: Box plots of natural and attack rewards for PPO and SA-PPO (solved by SGLD or
convex relaxations) on 3 environments. Each box is obtained from 30 models trained with the same
parameters as in models reported in Table 1 and tested for 50 episodes. The red lines inside the
boxes are median rewards, and the upper and lower sides of the boxes show 25% and 75% percentile
rewards of 30 models. The line segments outside of the boxes show min or max rewards.
achieves natural performance (without attacks) similar to that of vanilla PPO in Walker2d and Hopper,
and significantly improves the reward in Humanoid environment. Humanoid has high state-space
dimension (376) and is usually hard to train [18], and our results suggest that a robust objective can
be helpful even in a non-adversarial setting. We include more results in Appendix I.
Table 1: Average rewards ± standard deviation over 50 episodes on three baselines and SA-PPO. We
report natural rewards (no attacks) and rewards under five adversarial attacks. In each row we bold
the best (lowest) attack reward over all five attacks. The gray rows are the most robust models.
Env.
`∞ norm perturb-
ation budget  Method
Natural
Reward
Attack Reward Best
AttackCritic Random MAD RS RS+MAD
PPO (vanilla) 2554±853 1464 ±523 2101±793 1410± 655 794±238 781±175 781
PPO (adv. 50%) 174± 146 69 ±83 141± 128 42± 46 49 ±50 44± 43 42
PPO (adv. 100%) 6.1± 2.6 4.4 ±1.8 6.1± 3.2 5.8± 2.7 3.8 ±0.9 3.6 ±0.5 3.6
SA-PPO (SGLD) 2278± 957 3239± 808 2155± 904 2178± 878 1112± 373 1171±343 1112
Hopper 0.075
SA-PPO (Convex) 2197±744 2996±883 2488± 950 2123± 827 1031 ±365 1065± 378 1031
PPO (vanilla) 3460 ± 1170 3424 ± 1295 3007 ± 1200 2869 ± 1271 1336 ± 654 1307 ± 749 1307
PPO (adv. 50%) -11 ± 0.9 -10.6 ± 0.86 -10.99 ± 0.95 -10.78 ± 0.89 -11.55 ± 0.79 -11.37 ± 0.87 -11.55
PPO (adv. 100%) -113 ± 4.14 -111.9 ± 4.13 -111 ± 4.27 -112 ± 4.08 -114.4 ± 4.0 -114.5 ± 4.09 -114.5
SA-PPO (SGLD) 3566 ± 1363 4076 ± 997 3898 ± 1133 3837 ± 1215 2415 ± 1451 2615 ± 1299 2415
Walker2d 0.05
SA-PPO (Convex) 3654 ± 1459 3504 ± 1529 3808 ± 1305 2966 ± 1716 2841 ± 1679 3136 ± 1865 2841
PPO (vanilla) 2229 ± 1192 1889 ± 938 2073 ± 1197 1134 ± 585 672 ± 235 784±336 672
PPO (adv. 50%) 234± 28 198 ± 58 240 ± 19.4 148 ± 73 98 ± 69 101.5 ± 66.4 98
PPO (adv. 100%) 141.4 ± 20.6 140.25 ± 16.6 142.13 ± 16 140.23 ± 34.5 113.2 ± 18.5 112.6 ± 13.88 112.6
SA-PPO (SGLD) 5336 ± 1704 5766 ± 1414 5150 ± 1839 5361 ± 1773 4285 ± 2016 4369 ± 1929 4285
Humanoid 0.075
SA-PPO (Convex) 4986 ± 1596 5387 ± 1436 4790 ± 1882 4549 ± 1919 4392 ± 2122 4700 ± 1801 4392
Because PPO training can have large performance variance across multiple runs, to show that our
SA-PPO can consistently obtain a robust model, we repeatedly train each environment using SA-PPO
and vanilla PPO 30 times and attack all models we obtained. In Figures 4a and 4b we show the box
plot of the natural and best attack reward for these PPO and SA-PPO models. We can see that the best
attack reward of most SA-PPO models are consistently better than PPO models (in terms of median,
25% and 75% percentile rewards over 30 repetitions).
Evaluation of SA-DDPG We use a high quality DDPG implementation [54] as our baseline,
achieving similar or better performance on five Mujoco environments as in the literature [29, 13]. For
SA-DDPG, we use the same set of hyperparameters as in DDPG [54] (detailed in Appendix G), except
for the additional regularization term κDDPG for RDDPG which is searched in {3, 10, 30, 100, 300}.
The `∞ perturbation  is added into the normalized state space. We include vanilla DDPG, ad-
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Table 2: Average rewards ± standard deviation over 50 episodes on DDPG, adversarial training [43]
(50% and 100% steps) and SA-DDPG. To avoid clutter, we only report attack rewards under the
best (strongest) attack over all five attacks; full results of all 5 attacks available in Appendix I. Bold
numbers indicate the most robust model; italic numbers indicate models with poor robustness.
Environment Ant Hopper Inverted Pendulum Reacher Walker2d
`∞ norm perturbation budget  0.2 0.075 0.5 1.5 0.15
DDPG
(vanilla)
Natural Reward 1633 ± 631 3180 ± 390 1000 ± 0 -4.4 ± 1.6 2247 ± 1177
Attack Reward (best) 160 ± 301 704 ± 228 285 ± 232 -27.85 ± 5.83 711 ± 663
DDPG
(adv. 50%)
Natural Reward 715 ± 265 3010 ± 460 1000 ± 0 -4.79 ± 1.49 1029 ± 316
Attack Reward (best) 216 ± 235 3.8 ± 3.4 106 ± 81 -32.4 ± 6.2 103 ± 118
DDPG
(adv. 100%)
Natural Reward 63.8 ± 79 2680 ± 810 1000 ± 0 -5.97 ± 2.39 1242 ± 254
Attack Reward (best) -57.5 ± 71 413 ± 552 345 ± 290 -31.3 ± 4.6 41.7 ± 20.1
SA-DDPG
(SGLD)
Natural Reward 1503 ± 502 3035 ± 4.34 1000 ± 0 -5.2 ± 1.64 2760 ± 1563
Attack Reward (best) 1251 ± 543 2537 ± 745 1000 ± 0 -11.9 ± 5.2 817 ± 747
SA-DDPG
(convex relax)
Natural Reward 2111 ± 159 3496 ± 30.8 1000 ± 0 -5.2 ± 2.12 4234 ± 854
Attack Reward (best) 1959 ± 105 1722 ± 599 878 ± 279 -13.9 ± 3.8 1945 ± 1143
Table 3: Average rewards ± std and action certification rate over 50 episodes on three baselines
and SA-DQN. We report natural rewards (no attacks) and PGD attack rewards (under 10-step PGD).
Action Cert. Rate is the proportion of the actions during rollout that are guaranteed unchanged by
any attacks within the given . Bold numbers indicate the most robust model; italic numbers indicate
models with poor robustness.
Environment Pong Freeway BankHeist RoadRunner Acrobot
`∞ norm perturbation budget  1/255 0.2
DQN
(vanilla)
Natural Reward 20.7 ± 0.5 32.9 ± 0.7 1308.4 ± 24.1 36946.0 ± 6089.0 -67.5 ± 8.8
PGD Attack Reward -21.0±0.0 0.0±0.0 56.4±21.2 0.0±0.0 -349.7±178.0
Action Cert. Rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.735
DQN Adv. Training
(attack 50% frames)
Behzadan & Munir [3]
Natural Reward 10.1 ± 6.6 25.4±0.8 1126.0±70.9 22944.0±6532.5 -82.8±9.9
PGD Attack Reward -21.0 ± 0.0 0.0±0.0 9.4±13.6 14.0±34.7 -155.1±79.6
Action Cert. Rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.718
Imitation learning
Fischer et al. [11]
Natural Reward 19.73 32.93 238.66 12106.67 —
PGD Attack Reward 18.13 32.53 190.67 5753.33 —
SA-DQN
(PGD)
Natural Reward 21.0±0.0 33.9 ± 0.4 1245.2±14.5 34032.0±3845.0 -67.5±9.0
PGD Attack Reward 21.0±0.0 23.7 ± 2.3 1006.0±226.4 20402.0±7551.1 -116±21.7
Action Cert. Rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.707
SA-DQN
(convex)
Natural Reward 21.0 ± 0.0 30.78±0.5 1041.4±12.3 15172.0±791.7 -79.4±17.4
PGD Attack Reward 20.1 ± 0.0 30.36±0.7 1043.6±9.5 15280±827.7 -86.7±19.9
Action Cert. Rate 1.000 0.995 0.997 0.969 0.856
versarially trained DDPG [43] with 50% or 100% of training steps under attack as baselines, and
we evaluate SA-DDPG solved with SGLD and convex relaxations. We use the same set of five
attacks, but only report the strongest attack (lowest reward) in Table 2 (full results in Appendix I).
We observe that adversarial training is not effective in many environments, achieving low rewards
with or without attacks. SA-DDPG significantly improves robustness under strong attacks in all
five environments. Similar to the observations on SA-PPO, SA-DDPG can improve natural agent
performance in environments (Ant and Walker2d) with relatively high dimensional state space (111
and 17). Additionally, when trained using convex relaxations, SA-DDPG has less variance during
rollout (Figure 2).
To show that our SA-DDPG can consistently obtain a robust model and we do not cherry-pick good
results, we repeatedly train all 5 environments using SA-DDPG and DDPG 11 times each and attack
all models. We report the median, minimum, 25% and 75% rewards of 11 models in box plots.
The results are shown in Figure 5. We can observe that SA-DDPG is able to consistently improve
the robustness: the median, 25% and 75% percentile rewards under attacks are significantly and
consistently better than vanilla DDPG over all 5 environments.
Evaluation of SA-DQN We implement DoubleDQN [63] and Prioritized Experience Replay [51]
on four Atari games and one classic control problem, Acrobot. Detailed parameters and training
procedures are in Appendix H. For Atari games, we normalize the pixel values to [0, 1] and we add
`∞ adversarial noise with norm  = 1/255. For Acrobot, we normalize  with element-wise standard
deviation of state values collected over 100 episodes. We include vanilla DQNs and adversarially
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Figure 5: Box plots of natural and attack rewards for DDPG and SA-DDPG. Each box is obtained
from 11 models trained with the same parameters as the models reported in Table 2 and tested for 50
episodes (each sample of the box is an average reward over 50 episodes). The red lines inside the
boxes are median rewards, and the upper and lower sides of the boxes show 25% and 75% percentile
rewards. The line segments outside of the boxes show min or max rewards.
trained DQNs with 50% of frames under attack [3] during training time as baselines, and we report
results of robust imitation learning based approach as in [11]. We evaluate all methods under 10-step
untargeted PGD attacks (Appendix C), except that results from [11] was evaluated using a weaker
four-step PGD attack. In Table 3, we see that our SA-DQN achieves much higher rewards under
attacks in most environments, and naive adversarial training is mostly ineffective under strong attacks.
We obtain better rewards than [11] in most environments, as we learn the agent directly rather than
using two-step imitation learning.
Robustness certificates. When our robust policy regularizer is trained using convex relaxations, we
can obtain certain robustness certification under observation perturbations. For SA-DQN, we can
guarantee over 99.5% of actions do not change under any norm bounded perturbations for three
environments (Table 3). For a simple environment like Pong, we can guarantee actions do not change
for all frames during rollouts, thus guarantee the accumulative rewards under perturbation. For
SA-DDPG, the upper bounds on the maximal `2 difference in action changes is a few times smaller
than baseline for all five environments (results deferred to Appendix I).
5 Conclusions and Remarks
The field of reinforcement learning (RL) is being heavily developed in recent years, yet the robustness
of RL has not been investigated as thoroughly as in the supervised learning setting. Reinforcement
learning has the great potential to be applied into many mission-critical tasks such as autonomous
driving [53, 49, 74], if its robustness can be established. The robustness considered in our paper
is important for many realistic settings such as sensor noise, measurement errors, and man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks for a DRL system. Our paper is the first work that studies this problem in a
fundamental and systematic manner, and derives principles that are widely applicable to existing RL
algorithms. We believe the theoretical framework and comprehensive experiments in our work will
inform and inspire further research on robust deep reinforcement learning.
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Summary of Appendix Results
• We provide more empirical results in Section I. To demonstrate the convergence of our algorithm,
we repeat each experiment at least 10 times and plot the convergence of rewards during multiple runs.
We found that for some environments (like Humanoid) we can significantly and consistently improve
baseline performance. We also evaluate some settings under multiple perturbation strength .
• Readers who are interested in SA-MDP can find an example of SA-MDP in Section A and complete
proofs in Section B.
• Readers who are interested in adversarial attacks can find more details about our new attacks and
existing attacks in Section C. Especially, we discussed how a robust critic can help in attacking RL,
and show experiments on the improvements gained by the robustness objective during attack.
• Readers who want to know more background of convex relaxations of neural networks (used in
our work to solve the minimax objective) can refer to Section D.
• We provide detailed algorithm and hyperparameters for SA-PPO in Section F. We provide details
for SA-DDPG in Section G. We provide details for SA-DQN in Section H.
A An example of SA-MDP
We first show a simple environment and solve it under different settings of MDP and SA-MDP.
The environment have three states S = {S1, S2, S3} and 2 actions A = {A1, A2}. The transition
probabilities and rewards are defined as (unmentioned probabilities and rewards are 0):
Pr(s′ = S1|s = S1, a = A1) = 1.0
Pr(s′ = S2|s = S1, a = A2) = 1.0
Pr(s′ = S2|s = S2, a = A2) = 1.0
Pr(s′ = S3|s = S2, a = A1) = 1.0
Pr(s′ = S1|s = S3, a = A2) = 1.0
Pr(s′ = S2|s = S3, a = A1) = 1.0
R(s = S1, a = A2, s
′ = S2) = 1.0
R(s = S2, a = A1, s
′ = S2) = 1.0
R(s = S3, a = A1, s
′ = S3) = 1.0
The environment is illustrated in Figure 6. For the power of adversary, we allow ν to perturb one
state to any other two neighbouring states:
Bν(S1) = Bν(S2) = Bν(S3) = {S1, S2, S3}
Now we evaluate various policies for MDP and SA-MDP for this environment. We use γ = 0.99 as
the discount factor. A stationary and Markovian policy in this environment can be described by 3
parameters p11, p21, p31 where pij ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability Pr(a = Aj |s = Si).
• Optimal Policy for MDP. For a regular MDP, the optimal solution is p11 = 0, p21 = 1,
p31 = 1. We take A2 to receive reward and leave S1, and then keep doing A1 in S2 and S3.
The values for each state are V (S1) = V (S2) = V (S3) = 11−γ = 100, which is optimal.
However, this policy obtains V (S1) = V (S2) = V (S3) = 0 for SA-MDP, because we can set
ν(S1) = S2, ν(S2) = S1, ν(S3) = S1 and consequentially we always take the wrong action
receiving 0 reward.
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Figure 6: A simple 3-state environment.
• A Stochastic Policy for MDP and SA-MDP. We consider a stochastic policy where p11 =
p21 = p31 = 0.5. Under this policy, we randomly stay or move in each state, and has a 50%
probability of receiving a reward. The adversary ν has no power because pi is the same for
all states. In this situation, V (S1) = V (S2) = V (S3) = 0.51−0.99 = 50 for both MDP and
SA-MDP.
• Deterministic Policies for SA-MDP. Now we consider all 23 = 8 possible deterministic
policies for SA-MDP. Note that if for any state Si we have pi1 = 0 and another state Sj we
have pj1 = 1, we always have V (S1) = V (S2) = V (S3) = 0. This is because we can set
ν(S1) = Sj , ν(S2) = Si and ν(S3) = Si and always receive a 0 reward. Thus the only two
possible other policies are p11 = p21 = p31 = 0 and p11 = p21 = p31 = 1, respectively.
For p11 = p21 = p31 = 1 we have V (S1) = 0, V (S2) = V (S3) = 100 as we always take
A1 and never transit to other states; for p11 = p21 = p31 = 0, we circulate through all
three states and only receive a reward when we leave A1. We have V (S1) = 11−γ3 ≈ 33.67,
V (S2) =
γ2
1−γ3 ≈ 33.00 and V (S3) = γ1−γ3 ≈ 33.33.
Figure 7, 8, 9 give the graph of V (S1), V (S2) and V (S3) under three different settings of p11. The
figures are generated using Algorithm 1.
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Figure 7: Value functions when p11 = 0, with p21 ∈ [0, 1], p31 ∈ [0, 1]
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Figure 8: Value functions when p11 = 0.5, with different p21 ∈ [0, 1], p31 ∈ [0, 1]
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Figure 9: Value functions when p11 = 1.0, with different p21 ∈ [0, 1], p31 ∈ [0, 1]
B Proofs for State-Adversarial Markov Decision Process
Theorem 1 (Bellman equations for fixed pi and ν). Given pi : S → P(A) and ν : S → S , we have
V˜ piν (s) =
∑
a∈A
pi(a|ν(s))
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γV˜ piν (s
′)
]
Q˜piν (s, a) =
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γ
∑
a′∈A
pi(a′|ν(s′))Q˜piν (s′, a′)
]
.
Proof. Based on the definition of V˜ piν (s):
V˜ piν (s) = Epi◦ν
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1|st = s
]
= Epi◦ν
[
rt+1 + γ
∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+2|st = s
]
=
∑
a∈A
pi(a|ν(s))
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
rt+1 + γEpi◦ν
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+2|st+1 = s′
]]
=
∑
a∈A
pi(a|ν(s))
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γV˜ piν (s
′)
]
(9)
The recursion for Q˜piν (s, a) can be derived similarly. Additionally, we note the following useful
relationship between V˜ piν (s) and Q˜
pi
ν (s, a):
V˜ piν (s) =
∑
a∈A
pi(a|ν(s))Q˜piν (s, a) (10)
First we show that finding the optimal adversary ν∗ given a fixed pi for a SA-MDP can be cast into
the problem of finding an optimal policy in a regular MDP.
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Lemma 1 (Equivalence of finding optimal adversary in SA-MDP and finding optimal policy in MDP).
Given a SA-MDP M = (S,A, R, p) and a fixed policy pi, there exists a MDP Mˆ = (S, Aˆ, Rˆ, pˆ) such
that the optimal policy of Mˆ is the optimal adversary ν for SA-MDP given the fixed pi.
Proof. For a SA-MDP M = (S,A, R, p) and a fixed policy pi, we define a regular MDP Mˆ =
(S, Aˆ, Rˆ, pˆ) such that Aˆ = S, and ν is the policy for Mˆ . At each state s, our policy ν gives
a probability distribution ν(·|s) ∈ P(Aˆ) = P(S) indicating that we perturb a state s to sˆ with
probability ν(sˆ|s) in the SA-MDP M .
For Mˆ , the reward function is defined as:
Rˆ(s, aˆ, s′) =
{
−
∑
a∈A pi(a|aˆ)p(s′|s,a)R(s,a,s′)∑
a∈A pi(a|aˆ)p(s′|a,s) for s, s
′ ∈ S and aˆ ∈ B(s) ⊂ Aˆ = S,
−∞ for s, s′ ∈ S and aˆ /∈ B(s).
(11)
The above definition is based on the following conditional probability which marginalizes pi:
p(r|s, aˆ, s′) = p(r, s
′|s, aˆ)
p(s′|s, aˆ)
=
∑
a p(r, s
′|a, s, aˆ)pi(a|s, aˆ)∑
a p(s
′|a, s, aˆ)pi(a|s, aˆ)
=
∑
a p(r, s
′|a, s)pi(a|aˆ)∑
a p(s
′|a, s)pi(a|aˆ)
=
∑
a p(r|s′, a, s)p(s′|a, s)pi(a|aˆ)∑
a p(s
′|a, s)pi(a|aˆ)
Considering that p(r = R(S,A, S′)|s′ = S′, a = A, s = S) = 1.0 and 0 otherwise, and taking an
expectation over r yields the first case in (11). For aˆ /∈ B(s), we simply use a negative infinity
reward to prevent the adversary taking that action.
The transition probability pˆ is defined as
pˆ(s′|s, aˆ) =
∑
a∈A
pi(a|aˆ)p(s′|s, a) for s, s′ ∈ S and aˆ ∈ Aˆ = S.
Then we can get the value function Vˆ piν of this MDP for any policy ν not obtaining−∞ reward (never
taking an action aˆ /∈ B(s)):
Vˆ piν (s) := Epˆ,ν
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkrˆt+k+1|st = s
]
= Epˆ,ν
[
rˆt+1 + γ
∞∑
k=0
γkrˆt+k+2|st = s
]
=
∑
aˆ∈S
ν(aˆ|s)
∑
s′∈S
pˆ(s′|s, aˆ)
[
Rˆ(s, aˆ, s′) + γEpˆ,ν
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkrˆt+k+2|st+1 = s′
]]
=
∑
aˆ∈S
ν(aˆ|s)
∑
s′∈S
pˆ(s′|s, aˆ)
[
Rˆ(s, aˆ, s′) + γVˆ piν (s
′)
]
(12)
According to MDP theory [46], we know that the Mˆ has an optimal policy ν∗, which satisfies
Vˆ piν∗(s) ≥ Vˆ piν (s) for ∀s, ∀ν. We also know that this ν∗ is deterministic and assigns a unit mass
probability for the optimal action in B(s), because if a is not in B(s) the reward is −∞, and this
policy cannot be an optimal policy.
So from now on in this proof we only study policies in N := {ν : ∀s, ∃aˆ ∈ B(s), ν(aˆ|s) = 1}.
Note that all policies inN are deterministic and this class of policies consists ν∗. Also,N is consistent
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with the class of policies studied in Theorem 1. We denote the deterministic action aˆ chosen by a
ν ∈ N at s as ν(s). Then for ∀ν ∈ N , we have
Vˆ piν (s) =
∑
s′∈S
pˆ(s′|s, ν(s))
[
Rˆ(s, aˆ, s′) + γVˆ piν (s
′)
]
=
∑
s′∈S
∑
a∈A
pi(a|aˆ)p(s′|s, a)
[
−
∑
a∈A pi(a|aˆ)p(s′|s, a)R(s, a, s′)∑
a∈A pi(a|aˆ)p(s′|a, s)
+ γVˆ piν (s
′)
]
=
∑
a∈A
pi(a|ν(s))
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
−R(s, a, s′) + γVˆ piν (s′)
]
, (13)
or
−Vˆ piν (s) =
∑
a∈A
pi(a|ν(s))
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γ(−Vˆ piν (s′))
]
. (14)
Comparing (14) and (9), we know that −Vˆ piν = V˜ piν for any ν ∈ N . Then the optimal value function
Vˆ piν∗ satisfies:
Vˆ piν∗(s) = max
aˆ∈B(s)
∑
s′∈S
pˆ(s′|s, aˆ)
[
Rˆ(s, aˆ, s′) + γVˆ piν (s
′)
]
= max
sν∈B(s)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|sν)
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
−R(s, a, s′) + γVˆ piν∗(s′)
]
, (15)
where we denote the action aˆ taken at s as sν . So for ν∗, since −Vˆ piν∗ = V˜ piν∗ , we have
V˜ piν∗(s) = min
aˆ∈B(s)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|aˆ)
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γV˜ piν∗(s
′)
]
, (16)
and V˜ piν∗(s) ≤ V˜ piν (s) for ∀s, ∀ν ∈ N . Hence ν∗ is also the optimal ν for V˜ piν .
Lemma 1 gives many good properties for the optimal adversary. First, an optimal adversary always
exists. Second, we do not need to consider stochastic adversaries as there always exists an optimal
deterministic adversary. Additionally, showing Bellman contraction for finding the optimal adversary
can be done similarly as in obtaining the optimal policy in a regular MDP, as shown in the proof of
Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Bellman contraction for optimal adversary). Define Bellman operatorL : R|S| → R|S|,
(LV˜ pi)(s) = min
sν∈B(s)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|sν)
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γV˜ pi(s′)
]
. (17)
The Bellman equation for optimal adversary ν∗ can be written as: V˜ piν∗ = LV˜
pi
ν∗ . Additionally,L is
a contraction that converges to V˜ piν∗ .
Proof. Based on Lemma 1, this proof is technically similar to the proof of “optimal Bellman equation”
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in regular MDPs, where max over pi is replaced by min over ν. By the definition of V˜ piν∗(s),
V˜ piν∗(s) = min
ν
V˜ piν (s)
= min
ν
Epi◦ν
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+1|st = s
]
= min
ν
Epi◦ν
[
rt+1 + γ
∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+2|st = s
]
= min
ν
∑
a∈A
pi(a|ν(s))
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
rt+1 + γEpi◦ν
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+2|st+1 = s′
]]
= min
sν∈Bν(s)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|sν)
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
rt+1 + γmin
ν
Epi◦ν
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkrt+k+2|st+1 = s′
]]
= min
sν∈Bν(s)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|sν)
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
rt+1 + γV˜
pi
ν∗(s
′)
]
This is the Bellman equation for the optimal adversary ν∗; ν∗ is a fixed point of the Bellman operator
L .
Now we show the Bellman operator is a contraction. We have, ifL V˜ piν1(s) ≥ L V˜ piν2(s),
L V˜ piν1(s)−L V˜ piν2(s)
≤ max
sν∈Bν(s)
{∑
a∈A
pi(a|sν)
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γV˜ piν1(s
′)
]
−
∑
a∈A
pi(a|sν)
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)
[
R(s, a, s′) + γV˜ piν2(s
′)
]}
= γ max
sν∈Bν(s)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|sν)
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)[V˜ piν1(s′)− V˜ piν2(s′)]
≤ γ max
sν∈Bν(s)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|sν)
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)‖V˜ piν1 − V˜ piν2‖∞
= γ‖V˜ piν1 − V˜ piν2‖∞
The first inequality comes from the fact that
min
x1
f(x1)−min
x2
g(x2) ≤ f(x∗2)− g(x∗2) ≤ max
x
(f(x)− g(x)),
where x∗2 = arg minx2 g(x2). Similarly, we can prove L V˜
pi
ν2(s) −L V˜ piν1(s) ≤ ‖V˜ piν1 − V˜ piν2‖∞ if
L V˜ piν2(s) > L V˜
pi
ν1(s). Hence
‖L V˜ piν1(s)−L V˜ piν2(s)‖∞ = maxs |L V˜
pi
ν1(s)−L V˜ piν2(s)| ≤ γ‖V˜ piν1 − V˜ piν2‖∞.
Then according to the Banach fixed-point theorem, since 0 < γ < 1, V˜ piν converges to a unique fixed
point, and this fixed point is V˜ piν∗ .
A direct consequence of Theorem 2 is the policy evaluation algorithm (Algorithm 1) for SA-MDP,
which obtains the values for each state under optimal adversary for a fixed policy pi. For both Lemma 1
and Theorem 2, we only consider a fixed policy pi, and in this setting finding an optimal adversary is
not difficult. However, finding an optimal pi under the optimal adversary is more challenging, as we
can see in Section A, given the white-box attack setting where the adversary knows pi and can choose
optimal perturbations accordingly, an optimal policy for MDP can only receive zero rewards under
optimal adversary. We now show two intriguing properties for optimal policies in SA-MDP:
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Algorithm 1 Policy Evaluation for SA-MDP
Input: Policy pi, convergence threshold ε
Output: Values for policy pi, V piν∗(s)
Initialize V (s)← 0 for all s ∈ S
repeat
∆← 0
for all s ∈ S do
v ←∞, v0 ← V (s)
for all sν ∈ B(s) do
v′ ←∑a∈A pi(a|sν)∑s′∈S p(s′|s, a) · [R(s, a, s′) + γV˜ pi(s′)]
v ← min(v, v′)
end for
V (s)← v
∆← max(∆, |v0 − V (s)|)
end for
until ∆ < ε
V piν∗(s)← V (s)
Theorem 3. There exists an SA-MDP and some stochastic policy pi ∈ ΠMR such that we cannot find
a better deterministic policy pi′ ∈ ΠMD satisfying V˜ pi′ν∗(pi′)(s) ≥ V˜ piν∗(pi)(s) for all s ∈ S.
Proof. Proof by giving a counter example that no deterministic policy can be better than a random
policy. The SA-MDP example in section A provided such a counter example: all 8 possible
deterministic policies are no better than the stochastic policy p11 = p21 = p31 = 0.5.
Theorem 4. Under the optimal ν∗, an optimal policy pi∗ ∈ ΠMR does not always exist for SA-MDP.
Proof. The SA-MDP example in section A does not have an optimal policy. For pi1 where p11 =
p21 = p31 = 1 we have V pi1(S1) = 0, V pi1(S2) = V pi1(S3) = 100. This policy is not an optimal
policy since we have pi2 where p11 = p21 = p31 = 0.5 that can achieve V pi2(S1) = V pi2(S2) =
V pi2(S3) = 50 and V pi2(S1) > V pi1(S1).
An optimal policy pi, if exists, must be better than pi1 and have V pi(S1) > 0, V pi(S2) = V pi(S3) =
100. In order to achieve V pi(S2) = V pi(S3) = 100, we must set p21 = p31 = 1 since it is the only
possible way to start from S2 and S3 and receive +1 reward for every step. We can still change p11 to
probabilities other than 1, however if p11 < 1 the adversary can set ν(S2) = ν(S3) = S1 and reduce
V pi(S2) and V pi(S3). Thus, no policy better than pi1 exists, and since pi1 is not an optimal policy, no
optimal policy exists.
Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 show that the classic definition of optimality is probably not suitable
for SA-MDP. Further works can study how to obtain optimal policies for SA-MDP under some
alternative definition of optimality.
Theorem 5. Given a policy pi for a non-adversarial MDP. Under the optimal adversary ν in SA-MDP,
for all s ∈ S we have
max
s∈S
{
V pi(s)− V˜ piν∗(s)
} ≤ αmax
s∈S
max
sˆ∈B(s)
DTV (pi(·|s), pi(·|sˆ)) (18)
where DTV (pi(·|s), pi(·|sˆ)) is the total variation distance between pi(·|s) and pi(·|sˆ), and α :=
2[1 + γ(1−γ)2 ] max(s,a,s′)∈S×A×S |R(s, a, s′)| is a constant that does not depend on pi.
Proof. Our proof is based on Theorem 1 in Achiam et al. [1]. In fact, many works in the literature
have proved similar results under different scenarios [24, 45]. For an arbitrary starting state s0 and two
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arbitrary policies pi and pi′, Theorem 1 in Achiam et al. [1] gives an upper bound of V pi(s0)−V pi′(s0).
The bound is given by
V pi(s0)− V pi′(s0) ≤ −E s∼dpis0
a∼pi(·|s)
s′∼p(·|a,s)
[(pi′(a|s)
pi(a|s) − 1
)
R(s, a, s′)
]
+
2γ
(1− γ)2 maxs
{
E a∼pi′(·|s)
s′∼p(·|a,s)
[
R(s, a, s′)
]}
Es∼dpis0
[
DTV (pi(·|s), pi′(·|s))
]
,
(19)
where dpis0 is the discounted future state distribution from s0, defined as
dpis0(s) := (1− γ)
∞∑
t=0
γtPr(st = s|pi, s0). (20)
Note that in Theorem 1 of Achiam et al. [1], the author proved a general form with an arbitrary
function f and we assume f ≡ 0 in our proof. We also assume the starting state is deterministic, so
Jpi in Achiam et al. [1] is replaced by V pi(s0). Then we simply need to bound both terms on the right
hand side of (19).
For the first term we know that
−E s∼dpis0
a∼pi(·|s)
s′∼p(·|a,s)
[(pi′(a|s)
pi(a|s) − 1
)
R(s, a, s′)
]
=
∑
s
dpis0(s)
∑
a
[
pi(a|s)− pi′(a|s)]∑
s′
p(s′|s, a)R(s, a, s′)
≤
∑
s
dpis0(s)
∑
a
∣∣pi(a|s)− pi′(a|s)∣∣∣∣∑
s′
p(s′|s, a)R(s, a, s′)∣∣
≤ max
s,a,s′
|R(s, a, s′)|max
s
{∑
a
∣∣pi(a|s)− pi′(a|s)∣∣}
= 2 max
s,a,s′
|R(s, a, s′)|max
s
DTV (pi(·|s), pi′(·|s))
(21)
The second term is bounded by
2γ
(1− γ)2 maxs
{
E a∼pi′(·|s)
s′∼p(·|a,s)
[
R(s, a, s′)
]}
Es∼dpis0
[
DTV (pi(·|s), pi′(·|s))
]
≤ 2γ
(1− γ)2 maxs,a,s′ |R(s, a, s
′)|max
s
DTV (pi(·|s), pi′(·|s))
(22)
Therefore, the RHS of (19) is bounded by αmaxs DTV (pi(·|s), pi′(·|s)), where
α = 2[1 +
γ
(1− γ)2 ] maxs,a,s′ |R(s, a, s
′)| (23)
Finally, we simply let pi′(·|s) := pi(·|ν∗(s)) and the proof is complete.
Before proving 6 we first give a technical lemma about the total variation distance between two
multi-variate Gaussian distributions with the same variance.
Lemma 2. Given two multi-variate Gaussian distributionsX1 ∼ N (µ1, σ2In) andX2 ∼ N (µ2, σ2In),
µ1, µ2 ∈ Rn, define d = ‖µ2 − µ1‖2. We have DTV (X1, X2) =
√
2
pi
d
σ +O(d
3).
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Proof. Denote probability density of X1 and X2 as f1 and f2, and denote a = µ2−µ1d as the normal
vector of the perpendicular bisector line between µ1 and µ2. Due to the symmetry of Gaussian
distribution, f1(x) − f2(x) is positive for all x where a>x − a>µ1 − d2 > 0 and negative for
all x on the other symmetric side. When a>x − a>µ1 − d2 > 0,
∫
x∈Rn [f1(x) − f2(x)]dx =
Φ( d2σ )− (1− Φ( d2σ )) = 2Φ( d2σ )− 1. Thus,
DTV (X1, X2) =
∫
x∈Rn
|f1(x)− f2(x)|dx
= 2
∫
a>x−a>µ1− d2>0
(f1(x)− f2(x))dx
= 2(Φ(
d
2σ
)− (1− Φ( d
2σ
)))
= 2(2Φ(
d
2σ
)− 1)
Then we use the Taylor series for Φ(x) at x = 0:
Φ(x) =
1
2
+
1√
2pi
∞∑
n=0
(−1)nx2n+1
2nn!(2n+ 1)
Since we consider the case where d is small, we only keep the first order term and obtain:
DTV (X1, X2) =
√
2
pi
d
σ
+O(d3)
Theorem 6. DTV (p¯i(·|s), p¯i(·|sˆ)) =
√
2/pi dσ +O(d
3), where d = ‖pi(s)− pi(sˆ)‖2.
Proof. This theorem is a special case of Lemma 2 where X1 = p¯i(·|s), X2 = p¯i(·|s′) and X1 ∼
N (pi(s), σ2I), X2 ∼ N (pi(s′), σ2I).
C Additional details for adversarial attacks on state observa-
tions
C.1 More details on the Critic based attack
In Section 3.5 we discuss critic based attack [43] as a baseline. This attack requires a Q function
Q(s, a) to find the best perturbed state. In Algorithm 2 we present our “corrected” critic based attack
based on [43]:
Note that in Algorithm 4 of [43], they use the gradient∇Qs(s, pi(s)) = ∂Q∂s + ∂Q∂pi ∂pi∂s which essentially
attempts to minimize Q(sˆ, pi(sˆ)), but they then sample randomly along this gradient direction to find
the best sˆ that minimizes Q(s0, pi(sˆ)). Our corrected formulation directly minimizes Q(s0, pi(sˆ))
using this gradient instead∇Qs(s0, pi(s)) = ∂Q∂pi ∂pi∂s .
For PPO, since there is no Q(s, a) available during training, we extend [43] to perform attack relying
on V (s): we find a state sˆ that minimizes V (sˆ). Unfortunately, it does not match our setting of
perturbing state observations; it looks for a state sˆ that has the worst value (i.e., taking action pi(sˆ) in
state sˆ is bad), but taking the action pi(sˆ) at state s0 does not necessarily trigger a low reward action,
because V (sˆ) = maxaQ(sˆ, a) 6= maxaQ(s0, a). Thus, in Table 1 we can observe that critic based
attack typically does not work very well for PPO agents.
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Algorithm 2 Critic based attack [43]
Input: A policy function pi under attack, a corresponding Q(s, a) network, and a initial state s0, T
is the number of attack steps, η is the step size, s and s are valid lower and upper range of s.
for t = 1 to T do
gt = ∇Qst−1(s0, pi(st−1)) = ∂Q∂pi ∂pi∂st−1
gt ← proj(gt) .project gt according to norm constraint of s; for `∞ norm simply take the sign
st ← st−1 − ηgt
st ← min(max(st, s), s)
end for
Output: An adversarial state sˆ := sT
C.2 More details on the Maximal Action Difference (MAD) attack
We present the full algorithm of MAD in Algorithm 3. It is a relatively simple attack by directly
maximizing a KL-divergence using SGLD, yet it usually outperforms random attack and critic attack
on some environments (e.g., see Figure 11).
Algorithm 3 Maximal Action Difference (MAD) Attack (a critic-independent attack)
Input: A policy function pi under attack, and a initial state s0, T is the number of attack steps, η is
the step size, β is the (inverse) temperature parameter for SGLD, s and s are valid lower and upper
range of s.
Define loss function LMAD(s) = −DKL(pi(·|s0)‖pi(·|s))
for t = 1 to T do
Sample ξ ∼ N (0, 1)
gt = ∇LMAD(st−1) +
√
2
βη ξ
gt ← proj(gt) .project gt according to norm constraint of s; for `∞ norm simply take the sign
st ← st−1 − ηgt
st ← min(max(st, s), s)
end for
Output: An adversarial state sˆ := sT
C.3 More details on the Robust Sarsa attack
Algorithm 4 gives the full procedure of the Robust Sarsa attack. We collect trajectories of the agents
and then optimize the ordinary temporal difference (TD) loss along with a robust objective Lrobust(θ).
Lrobust(θ) constrains that when an input action a is slightly changed, the value QpiRS(s, a) should
not change significantly. We set the perturbation set Bp(a, ) to be a `p norm ball with radius 
around an action a. We gradually increase  from 0 to max during training to learn a critic that is
increasingly robust. The inner maximization of Lrobust(θ) is upper bounded by convex relaxations of
neural networks, which we will introduce in section D. Once the inner maximization is eliminated,
we solve the final objective use regular first order optimization methods. In our attacks to DDPG and
PPO, we try multiple regularization parameter λRS to find the best Sarsa model that achieves lowest
attack rewards.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, RS attack can also be used as a blackbox attack when
perturbing the actions, as QpiθRS can be learned by observing the environment and the agent without
any internal information of the agent. Then, using the robust critic we learned, black-box attacks can
be performed on action space by solving minQpiθRS (s, a) with a norm constrained a.
We provide some empirical justifications for the necessity of using a robust objective. For both
PPO and DDPG, we conduct attacks using a Sarsa network trained with and without the robustness
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Algorithm 4 Train a Robust Sarsa network for critic-independent attack
Input: Any policy function pi under attack, T is the number of training steps, and an epsilon schedule
t
Initialize QpiRS(s, a) to be a random network
for t = 1 to T do
Run the agent with policy pi and collect a batch of N steps: {si, ai, ri, s′i, a′i}, i ∈ [N ]
LTD(θ) =
∑
i∈[N ] [ri + γQ
pi
RS(s
′
i, a
′
i)−QpiRS(si, ai)]2
Lrobust(θ) =
∑
i∈[N ] maxaˆ∈Bp(ai,t)(Q
pi
RS(si, aˆ)−QpiRS(si, ai))2
Lrobust = ConvexRelaxUB(Lrobust, θ, Bp(ai, t)), where Lrobust(θ) ≤ Lrobust(θ) .Solving the
inner maximization by upper bounding Lrobust using an automatic NN convex relaxation tool
Minimize LRS(θ) = LTD(θ) + λRSLrobust(θ) using any gradient based optimizer (e.g., Adam)
end for
Output: A robust critic function QpiRS that can be used for critic based attack.
objective, in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. We observe that the robust objective can decrease
reward further more for many settings.
Table 4: Comparison between Non-robust Sarsa attack (without the robustness objective Lrobust(θ))
and robust Sarsa attack on PPO and SA-PPO models in Table 1. The Robust Sarsa Attack Reward
column is the same result presented in RS column of Table 1. We report mean reward ± standard
deviation over 50 attack episodes.
Env.
`∞ norm perturb-
ation budget  Method
Non-robust Sarsa
Attack Reward
Robust Sarsa
Attack Reward
PPO (vanilla) 3214 ±605 1321 ± 189
PPO (adv. 50%) 276 ±140 98 ± 92
PPO (adv. 100%) 14.4± 4.20 11.7 ± 4.49
SA-PPO (SGLD) 2306± 920 1675 ± 538
Hopper 0.05
SA-PPO (Convex) 1849± 786 1797 ± 910
PPO (vanilla) 2847 ± 1404 1336 ± 654
PPO (adv. 50%) -10.79 ± 0.93 -11.55 ± 0.79
PPO (adv. 100%) -111.9± 4.5 -114.4 ± 4.0
SA-PPO (SGLD) 3476± 1405 2415 ± 1451
Walker2d 0.05
SA-PPO (Convex) 3481 ± 1640 2841 ± 1679
PPO (vanilla) 804± 290 672 ± 235
PPO (adv. 50%) 166± 78 98 ± 69
PPO (adv. 100%) 122.6± 15.9 113.2 ± 18.5
SA-PPO (SGLD) 5025± 1931 4285 ± 2016
Humanoid 0.075
SA-PPO (Convex) 4970± 1786 4392 ± 2122
Hybrid RS+MAD attack. We find that RS and MAD attack can achieve best results on different
tasks in some cases. We thus combine them to form a hybrid attack, which minimizes the robust
critic predicted value and in the meanwhile maximizes action differences. It can be conducted by
minimizing this loss function:
LHybrid(sˆ) = αRS-MADQθQ(s, piθRS (sˆ)) + (1− αRS-MAD)LMAD(sˆ)
We try different values of αRS-MAD and report the best attack (lowest reward) as the reward under this
attack.
C.4 Attack for DQN
For DQN, we use the regular untargeted Projected Gradient Decent (PGD) attack in the literature [30,
43, 70]. The untargeted PGD attack with K iterations updates the state K times as follows:
sk+1 = sk + ηproj[∇skH(Qθ(sk, ·), a∗)],
s0 = s, k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 (24)
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Table 5: Comparison between Non-robust Sarsa attack (without the robustness objective) and robust
Sarsa attack on DDPG and SA-DDPG models in Table 2. The Robust Sarsa Attack Reward column is
the same result presented in the RS column of Table 2. We report mean reward ± standard deviation
over 50 attack episodes.
Env.
`∞ norm perturb-
ation budget  Method
Non-robust Sarsa
Attack Reward
Robust Sarsa
Attack Reward
DDPG (vanilla) 390.18 ± 472.07 367.74 ± 346.33Ant 0.2 SA-DDPG (Convex) 2036.16 ± 110.85 2011.44 ± 107.82
DDPG (vanilla) 874.35 ± 472.85 703.97 ± 227.82Hopper 0.075 SA-DDPG (Convex) 3320.00 ± 32.94 1722.20 ± 598.55
DDPG (vanilla) 1000.00 ± 0.00 1000.00 ± 0.00InvertedPendulum 0.5 SA-DDPG (Convex) 970.36 ± 124.24 1000.00 ± 0.00
DDPG (vanilla) -19.34 ± 3.58 -17.05 ± 3.76Reacher 1.5 SA-DDPG (Convex) -11.69 ± 4.91 -13.65 ± 3.64
DDPG (vanilla) 443.44 ± 485.36 711.50 ± 663.04Walker2d 0.15 SA-DDPG (Convex) 3106.54 ± 1342.82 2207.39 ± 1266.02
where H(Qθ(sk, ·), a∗) is the cross-entropy loss between the output logits of Qθ(sk, ·) and the
onehot-encoded distribution of a∗ := arg maxaQθ(s, a). proj[·] is a projection operator depending
on the norm constraint of B(s) and η is the learning rate. A successful untargeted PGD attack will
then perturb the state to lead the Q network to output an action other than the optimal action a∗
chosen at the original state s. To guarantee that the final state obtained by the attack is within an `∞
ball around s (B(s) = {sˆ : s −  ≤ sˆ ≤ s + }), the projection proj[·] is a sign operator and η is
typically set to η = K .
D Backgrounds for Convex Relaxation of Neural Networks
In our work, we frequently need to solve a minimax problem:
min
θ
max
φ∈S
g(θ, φ) (25)
One approach we discussed above is to first solve the inner maximization problem (approximately)
using an optimizer like SGLD. However, due to the non-convexity of piθ, we cannot solve the inner
maximization to global maxima, and the gap between local maxima and global maxima can be large.
Using convex relaxations of neural networks, we can instead find an upper bound of maxφ∈S g(θ, φ):
g(θ) ≥ max
φ∈S
g(θ, φ)
Thus we can minimize an upper bound instead, which can guarantee the original objective (25) is
minimized.
As an illustration on how to find g(θ) using convex relaxations, following [50] we consider a simple
L-layer MLP network f(θ, x) with parameters θ = {(W (i), b(i)), i ∈ {1, · · · , L}} and activation
function σ. We denote x(0) = x as the input, x(i) as the post-activation value for layer i, z(i) as the
pre-activateion value for layer i. i ∈ {1, · · · , L}. The output of the network f(θ, x) is z(L). Then,
we consider the following optimization problem:
max
x∈S
f(θ, x), where S is the set of perturbations
which is equivalent to the following optimization problem:
max z(L)
s.t. z(l) = W (l)x(l−1) + b(l), l ∈ [L],
x(l) = σ(z(l)), l ∈ [L− 1],
x(0) ∈ S
(26)
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In this constrained optimization problem (26), assuming S is a convex set, the constraint on z(l) is
convex (linear) and the only non-convex constraints are those for x(l), where a non-linear activation
function is involved. Note that activation function σ(z) itself can be a convex function, but when
used as an equality constraint, the feasible solution is constrained to the graph of σ(z), which is
non-convex.
Previous works [68, 75, 50] propose to use convex relaxations of non-linear units to relax the non-
convex constraint x(l) = σ(z(l)) with a convex one, x(l) = convex(σ(z(l))), such that (26) can be
solved efficiently. We can then obtain an upper bound of f(θ, x) since the constraints are relaxed.
Zhang et al. [75] gave several concrete examples (e.g., ReLU, tanh, sigmoid) on how these relaxations
are formed. In the special case where linear relaxations are used, (26) can be solved efficiently and
automatically (without manual derivation and implementation) for general computational graphs [72].
Generally, using the framework from Xu et al. [72] we can access an oracle function ConvexRelaxUB
defined as below:
Definition 1. Given a neural network function f(X) where X is any input for this function, and
X ∈ S where S is the set of perturbations, the oracle function ConvexRelaxUB provided by an
automatic neural network convex relaxation tool returns an upper bound f , which satisfies:
f ≥ max
X∈S
f(X)
Note that in the above definition, X can by any input for this computation (e.g., X can be s, a, or
θ for a Qθ(s, a) function). In the special case of our paper, for simplicity we define the notation
ConvexRelaxUB(f, θ, s∈B(s)) which returns an upper bound function f(θ) for maxs∈B(s) f(θ, s).
E Robustness Certificates for Deep Reinforcement Learning
If we use the convex relaxation in Section D to train our networks, it can produce robustness
certificates for our task. However in some RL tasks the certificates have interpretations different from
classification tasks, as discussed in detail below.
Robustness Certificates for DQN. In DQN, the action space is finite, so we have a robustness
certificate on the actions taken at each state. More specifically, at each state s, policy pi’s action is
certified if its corresponding Q function satisfies
arg max
a
Qθ(s, a) = arg max
a
Qθ(sˆ, a) = a
∗, for all sˆ ∈ B(s). (27)
As mentioned in Section 3.4 if uQθ,a∗,a ≤ 0 holds for all sˆ ∈ B(s), we have
Q−θ (sˆ, a, a
∗) := Qθ(sˆ, a)−Qθ(sˆ, a∗) ≤ 0 (28)
is guaranteed for all a ∈ A, which means that the agent’s action will not change when the state
observation is in B(s). When the agent’s action is not changed under adversarial perturbation, its
reward and transition at current step will not change in the DQN setting, either.
In some settings, we find that 100% of the actions are guaranteed to be unchanged (e.g., the Pong
environment in Table 3). In that case, we can in fact also certify the accumulated reward is not
changed given the specific initial conditions for testing. However, it can still be challenging to certify
that the agent is robust under any starting condition. Similarly, in classification problems many
existing certified defenses [69, 38, 15, 77] can only practically guarantee robustness on a specific test
set (by computing a “verified test error”), rather than on any input image.
Robustness Certificates for PPO and DDPG. In DDPG and PPO, the action space is continuous,
hence it is not possible to certify that actions do not change under adversary. We instead seek for a
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different type of guarantee, where we can upper bound the change in action given a norm bounded
input perturbation:
Us ≥ max
sˆ∈B(s)
‖piθpi (sˆ)− piθpi (s)‖ (29)
Given a state s, we can use convex relaxations to compute an upper bound Us. Generally speaking,
if B(s) is small, a robust policy desires to have a small Us, otherwise it can be possible to find
an adversarial state perturbation that greatly changes piθpi (sˆ) and causes the agent to misbehave.
However, giving certificates on accumulative rewards is still challenging, as it requires to bound
reward r(s, a) given a fixed state s, and a perturbed and bounded action a (bounded via (29)). Since
the environment dynamics can be quite complex in practice (except for the simplest environment like
InvertedPendulum), it is hard to bound reward changes given a bounded action. We leave this part
as a future direction for exploration and we believe the robustness certificates (29) can be useful for
future works.
F Additional details for SA-PPO
Algorithm We present the full SA-PPO algorithm in Algorithm 5. Comparing to vanilla PPO,
we add a robust action regularizer which constrains the KL divergence on state perturbations. The
regulairzer LSA(θpi) can be solved using SGLD or convex relaxations of neural networks. We
define the perturbation set B(s) to be a `p norm ball around state s with radius : Bp(s, ) :=
{s′|‖s′ − s‖p ≤ }. We use a  schedule during training, where  is slowly increasing during each
epoch t as t.
Hyperparameters for Regular PPO training We use the optimal hyperparameters in [10] which
were found using a grid search for vanilla PPO. We run 2048 simulation steps per iteration, and run
policy optimization of 10 epochs with a minibatch size of 64 using Adam optimizer with learning
rate 0.0004. The value network is also trained in 10 epochs per iteration with a minibatch size of
64, using Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.0003. Both networks are 3-layer MLPs with [64, 64]
hidden neurons. The clipping value  for PPO is 0.2. We clip rewards to [−10, 10] and states to
[−10, 10]. The discount factor γ for reward is 0.99 and the discount factor used in generalized
advantage estimation (GAE) is 0.95. We found that in [10] the agent rewards are still improving when
training finishes, thus in our experiments we run the agents longer for better convergence: we run
Walker2d and Hopper 2× 106 steps (976 iterations) and Humanoid 1× 107 steps (4882 iterations) to
ensure convergence.
Hyperparameter for SA-PPO training For SA-PPO, we use the same set of hyperparameters
as in PPO. Note that the hyperparameters are tuned for PPO but not specifically for SA-PPO. The
additional regularization parameter κPPO for the regularizerRPPO is chosen in {0.01, 0.03, 0.1, 0.3}.
We linearly increase t, the norm of `∞ perturbation on normalized states, from 0 to the target value
( for evaluation, reported in Table 1) during the first 3/4 iterations, and keep t =  for the reset
iterations. The same  schedule is used for both SGLD and convex relaxation training. For SGLD,
we run 10 iterations with step size t10 and set the temperature parameter β = 1× 10−5. For convex
relaxations, we use the efficient IBP+Backward scheme [72], and we use a training schedule similar
to [77] by mixing the IBP bounds and backward mode perturbation analysis bounds.
G Additional details for SA-DDPG
Algorithm We present the SA-DDPG training algorithm in Algorithm 6. The main difference
comparing to regular DDPG is the additional loss term LSA(θpi), which provides an upper bound on
maxs∈B(si) ‖pi(s)− pi(si)‖22. We define the perturbation set B(s) to be a `p norm ball around s with
30
Algorithm 5 State-Adversarial Proximal Policy Optimization (SA-PPO)
Input: Number of iterations T , a  schedule t
1: Initialize actor network pi(a|s) and critic network V (s) with parameter θpi and θV ,
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Run piθpi to collect a set of trajectories D = {τk} containing |D| episodes, each τk is a
trajectory contain |τk| samples, τk := {(sk,i, ak,i, rk,i, sk,i+1)}, i ∈ [|τk|]
4: Compute cumulative reward Rˆk,i for each step i in every episode k using the trajectories and
discount factor γ
5: Update Value function by minimizing the mean-square error:
θV ← arg min
θV
1∑
k |τk|
∑
τk∈D
|τk|∑
i=0
(
V (sk,i)− Rˆk,i
)2
6: Estimate advantage Aˆk,i for each step i in every episode k using generalized advantage
estimation (GAE) and value function VθV (s)
7: Define the robust policy regularier:
LSA(θpi) :=
1∑
k |τk|
∑
τk∈D
|τk|∑
i=0
max
s¯k,i∈Bp(sk,i,t)
DKL (pi(a|sk,i)‖pi(a|s¯k,i))
8: Option 1: Solve LSA(θpi) using SGLD:
9: find sˆk,i = arg maxs¯k,i∈Bp(sk,i,t)
1∑
k |τk|
∑
τk∈D
∑|τk|
i=0 DKL(pi(a|sk,i)‖pi(a|s¯k,i)) us-
ing SGLD optimization
10: set LSA(θpi) := 1∑
k |τk|
∑
τk∈D
∑|τk|
i=0 DKL(pi(a|sk,i)‖pi(a|sˆk,i))
11: Option 2: Solve LSA(θpi, s¯i) using convex relaxations:
12: LSA(θpi) := ConvexRelaxUB(LSA, θpi, s¯k,i ∈ Bp(sk,i, t))
13: Update the policy by minimizing the SA-PPO objective (the minimization is solved using
ADAM):
θpi ← arg min
θ′pi
1∑
k |τk|
∑
τk∈D
|τk|∑
i=0
min
(
rθ′pi (ak,i|sk,i)Aˆk,i, g(rθ′pi (ak,i|sk,i))Aˆk,i
)
+κPPOLSA(θ
′
pi)
where rθ′pi (ak,i|sk,i) :=
piθ′pi (ak,i|sk,i)
piθpi (ak,i|sk,i) , g(r) := clip(rθ′pi (ak,i|sk,i), 1− clip, 1 + clip)
14: end for
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radius : Bp(s, ) := {s′|‖s′ − s‖p ≤ }. We use a  schedule during training, where  is slowly
increasing during training as t.
Algorithm 6 State-Adversarial Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (SA-DDPG)
Initialize actor network pi(s) and critic network Q(s, a) with parameter θpi and θQ
Initialize target network pi′(s) and critic network Q′(s, a) with weights θpi′ ← θpi and θQ′ ← θQ
Initial replay buffer B
for t = 1 to T do
Initial a random process N for action exploration
Choose action at ∼ pi(st) + ,  ∼ N
Observe reward rt, next state st+1 from environment
Store transition {st, at, rt, st+1} into B
Sample a mini-batch of N samples {si, ai, ri, s′i} from B
yi ← ri + γQ′(s′i, pi′(s′i)) for all i ∈ [N ]
Update θQ by minimizing loss L(θQ) = 1N
∑
i (yi −Q(si, ai))2
LSA(θpi, s¯i) :=
1
N
∑
i maxs¯i∈Bp(si,t) ‖piθpi (si)− piθpi (s¯i)‖2
Option 1: Solve LSA,s¯i(θpi) using SGLD:
find sˆi = arg maxs¯i∈Bp(si,t)
∑
i ‖piθpi (si)− piθpi (s¯i)‖2
set LSA(θpi) := 1N
∑
i ‖piθpi (si)− piθpi (sˆi)‖2
Option 2: Solve LSA(θpi, s¯i) using convex relaxations:
LSA(θpi) := ConvexRelaxUB(LSA, θpi, s¯i ∈ Bp(si, t))
Update θpi using deterministic policy gradient and gradient of LSA(θpi):
∇θpiJ(θpi) = 1N
∑
i
[∇aQ(s, a)|s=si,a=pi(si)∇θpipi(s)|s=si + κDDPG∇θpiLSA(θpi)]
Update Target Network:
θQ′ ← τθQ + (1− τ)θQ′
θpi′ ← τθpi + (1− τ)θpi′
end for
Hyperparameters for Regular DDPG training. Both actor and critic networks are 3-layer MLPs
with [400, 300] hidden neurons. We run each environment for 2× 106 steps. Actor network learning
rate is 1× 10−4 and critic network learning rate is 1× 10−3 (except that for Hopper-v2 the learning
rate is reduced to 1× 10−4 due to the larger values of rewards); both networks are optimized using
Adam optimizer. No reward scaling is used, and discount factor is set to 0.99. We use a replay buffer
with a capacity of 1× 106 items and we do not use prioritized replay buffer sampling. For the random
process N used for exploration, we use a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with θ = 0.15 and σ = 0.2.
The mixing parameter of current and target actor and critic networks is set to τ = 0.001.
Hyperparameters for SA-DDPG training. SA-DDPG uses the same hyperparameters as in
DDPG training. For the additional regularization parameter κ for pi(s), we choose κ ∈ {3.0, 10.0, 30.0, 100, 300}.
We train the actor network without actor regularization for the first 1 × 106 steps, then increase 
from 0 to the target value in 5× 105 steps, and then keep training at the target  for 5× 105 steps.
The same  schedule is used for both SGLD and convex relaxation. For SGLD, we run 5 iterations
with step size t5 and set the temperature parameter β = 1× 10−5. For convex relaxations, we use
the efficient IBP+Backward scheme [72], and a training schedule similar to [77] by mixing the IBP
bounds and backward mode perturbation analysis bounds. The total number of training steps is thus
2× 106, which is the same as the regular DDPG training. The target  values for each task is the same
as  listed in Table 2 for evaluation, except that for InvertedPendulum we set  = 0.75 during training.
Note that we rescale  by the standard deviations of each state variable. The standard deviations are
calculated using data collected on baseline policy without adversaries.
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H Additional details for SA-DQN
Algorithm We present the SA-DQN training algorithm in Algorithm 7. The main difference
comparing to regular DQN is the additional hinge loss term L˜, which encourage the network not to
change its output under perturbations on the state observation.
Algorithm 7 State-Adversarial Deep Q-Learning (SA-DQN)
1: Initialize current Q network Q(s, a) with parameters θ.
2: Initialize target Q network Q′(s, a) with parameters θ′ ← θ.
3: Initial replay buffer B
4: for t = 1 to T do
5: With probability t select a random action at at, otherwise select at = arg maxaQθ(st, a; θ)
6: Execute action at in environment and observe reward rt and state st+1
7: Store transition {st, at, rt, st+1} in B.
8: Randomly sample a minibatch of N samples {si, ai, ri, s′i} from B.
9: For all si, compute a∗i = arg maxaQθ(si, a; θ).
10: Set yi = ri + γmaxa′ Q′θ′(s
′
i, a
′; θ) for non-terminal si, and yi = ri for terminal si.
11: Compute TD-loss for each transition: TD-L(si, ai, s′i; θ) = Huber(yi −Qθ(si, ai; θ))
12: Option 1: Use projected gradient descent (PGD)
13: Run PGD to solve: sˆi = arg maxsˆi∈B(si) maxaj 6=a∗i Qθ(sˆi, aj ; θ)−Qθ(sˆi, a∗i ; θ).
14: Compute hinge loss for each si:
L˜(si; θ) = max
{
maxsˆi∈B(s) maxaj 6=a∗i Qθ(sˆi, aj ; θ)−Qθ(sˆi, a∗i ; θ),−c
}
15: Option 2: Use convex relaxations of neural networks
16: For all si and all aj 6= a∗i , obtain upper bounds on Qθ(s, aj ; θ)−Qθ(s, a∗i ; θ):
ua∗i ,aj (si; θ) = ConvexRelaxUB(Qθ(s, aj ; θ)−Qθ(s, a∗i ; θ), θ, s ∈ B(si))
17: Compute hinge loss for each si: L˜(si; θ) = max
{
maxaj 6=a∗i {ua∗i ,aj (si)},−c
}
18: Perform a gradient descent step to minimize 1N
∑
i TD-L(si, ai, s
′
i; θ) + κDQNL˜(si; θ).
19: Update Target Network every M steps: θ′ ← θ.
20: end for
Hyperparameters for Regular DQN training. For Atari games, the deep Q networks have 3
CNN layers followed by 2 fully connected layers. The first CNN layer has 32 channels, a kernel size
of 8, and stride 4. The second CNN layer has 64 channels, a kernel size of 4, and stride 2. The third
CNN layer has 64 channels, a kernel size of 3, and stride 1. The fully connected layers have 512
hidden neurons. For Atari games, we run each environment for 6× 106 steps without framestack. For
Acrobot, the deep Q network is a 3-layer MLP with [128,128] hidden neorons and we run 6× 105
steps. The learning rate is 1× 10−3 for Acrobot, 1× 10−5 for BankHeist, 2× 10−5 for RoadRunner,
and 6.25× 10−5 for Pong and Freeway. For all environments, no reward scaling is used, and discount
factor is set to 0.99. For all Atari environments, we use a replay buffer with a capacity of 2× 105
and for Acrobot, the capacity is reduced to 2× 104. Prioritized replay buffer sampling is used with
α = 0.5 and β increased from 0.4 to 1 linearly in 6× 105 for Acrobot and 4× 106 steps for Atari
games. A batch size of 32 is used and the target network is updated every 2000 steps. We use Huber
loss in TD-loss.
Hyperparameters for SA-DQN training. SA-DQN uses the same network structure and hyper-
parameters as in DQN training, except that for Freewaay and BankHeist, we increase the schedule
length of buffer’s β to 6 × 106. For the additional regularization parameter κ for robustness, we
choose κ ∈ {0.005, 0.01, 0.02}. The total number of SA-DQN training steps in all environments are
the same as those in DQN. For Pong and RoadRunner, we train the Q network without regularization
for the first 1.5 × 106 steps, then increase  from 0 to the target value in 2 × 106 steps, and then
keep training at the target  for 2.5× 106 steps. For Freeway and BankHeist, this  schedule starts
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(a) Natural rewards (no attacks)
Ho
pp
er 
Va
nill
a P
PO
Ho
pp
er 
PP
O (
ad
v 5
0%
)
Ho
pp
er 
PP
O (
ad
v 1
00
%)
Ho
pp
er 
SA
-PP
O(C
on
ve
x)
Ho
pp
er 
SA
-PP
O(S
GL
D)
Wa
lke
r V
an
illa
 PP
O
Wa
lke
r P
PO
 (a
dv
 50
%)
Wa
lke
r P
PO
 (a
dv
 10
0%
)
Wa
lke
r S
A-P
PO
(Co
nv
ex
)
Wa
lke
r S
A-P
PO
(SG
LD
)
Hu
ma
no
id 
Va
nill
a P
PO
Hu
ma
no
id 
PP
O (
ad
v 5
0%
)
Hu
ma
no
id 
PP
O (
ad
v 1
00
%)
Hu
ma
no
id 
SA
-PP
O(C
on
ve
x)
Hu
ma
no
id 
SA
-PP
O(S
GL
D)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Re
wa
rd
(b) Rewards under the best (strongest) attacks
Figure 10: Box plots of natural rewards and rewards under the strongest (best) attacks for PPO,
adversarially trained PPO and SA-PPO agents corresponding to the results presented in Table 1
(Table 1 only reports mean and standard deviation). Each box shows the distribution of accumulated
rewards collected from 50 episodes of a single model. The red lines inside the boxes are median
rewards, and the upper and lower sides of the boxes show 25% and 75% percentile rewards of 50
episodes. The line segments outside of the boxes show min or max rewards.
at 1 × 106th step with a length of 4 × 106 steps. For Acrobot, this  schedule starts at 2 × 104th
step with a length of 1 × 105 steps. For convex relaxations, we use the efficient IBP+Backward
scheme [72], and we use a training schedule similar to [77] by mixing the IBP bounds and backward
mode perturbation analysis bounds. The confidence constant c of hinge loss is 1 in Atari environments
and is 0.01 in Acrobot.
I Additional Experimental Results
I.1 More results on SA-PPO
Box plots of rewards for SA-PPO models In Table 1, we report the mean and standard deviation
of rewards for models under attack. However, since the distribution of accumulative rewards can be
non-Gaussian, in this section we include box plots of rewards for each task in Figure 10. We can
observe that the rewards (median, 25% and 75% percentiles) under the strongest attacks (Figure 10b)
significantly improve.
Evaluation using multiple  In Figure 11 we show the attack reward of PPO and SA-PPO models
with different perturbation budget . We can see that the lowest attack rewards of SA-PPO models
are higher than those of PPO under all  values. Additionally, Robust Sarsa attacks are stronger
comparing to other attacks. On vanilla PPO models, MAD attack is also competitive.
Convergence of PPO and SA-PPO agents Especially, we want to confirm that our significantly
better performing Humanoid model is not just by chance. We train each environment using SA-PPO
and PPO at least 30 times, and collect rewards during training. We plot the median, 25% and 75%
percentile of all these runs in Figure 12 and here we report the moving average value of 10 consecutive
episodes.
We can see that our SA-PPO models’ natural reward during training significantly and consistently
outperforms PPO models in Humanoid. Since we also present the 25% and 75% percentile of
the rewards among 30 models, we believe this improvement is not because of cherry-picking. For
Hopper and Walker environments, SA-PPO achieves slightly lower but still quite competitive rewards;
SA-PPO agents obtain significantly more robustness.
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Figure 11: Attacking PPO agents under different  values. Each data point reported in this figure is
an average of 50 episodes.
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Figure 12: The median, 25% and 75% percentile episode reward of 30 PPO and 30 SA-PPO models
during training. We report the moving average value of 10 consecutive episodes. The region of the
shaded colors (light blue: SA-PPO solved with SGLD; light green: SA-PPO solved with convex
relaxations; light red: vanilla PPO) represent the interval between 25% and 75% percentile rewards
over the 30 different training runs, and the solid line is the median rewards over 30 runs.
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I.2 More results on SA-DDPG
Full attack results In Table 7 we present attack rewards on all of our DDPG models. In the main
text, we only report the strongest (lowest) attack rewards since the lowest reward determines the true
model robustness.
Table 6: Comparison between Smoothed and Non-smoothed policies on SA-DDPG (Convex) models
in Table 2. We report mean reward ± standard deviation over 50 attack episodes.
Env.
`∞ norm perturb-
ation budget 
Smoothed
Natural Reward
Non-smoothed
Natural Reward
Smoothed
Best Attack Reward
Non-smoothed
Best Attack Reward
Ant 0.2 2129.70 ± 60.54 2111.22 ± 158.88 1963.91 ± 56.19 1958.79 ± 105.24
Hopper 0.075 3348.96 ± 516.18 3496.25 ± 30.84 1555.24 ± 953.33 1603.90 ± 589.46
InvertedPendulum 0.5 1000.00 ± 0.00 1000.00 ± 0.00 800.98 ± 329.25 877.86 ± 279.33
Reacher 1.5 -5.43 ± 2.26 -5.22 ± 2.12 -12.51 ± 4.74 -13.86 ± 3.82
Walker2d 0.15 3379.16 ± 1433.54 4234.60 ± 853.86 2079.65 ± 1069.95 1944.77 ± 1143.25
Adding noise to DDPG and SA-DDPG In Section 3.3, our theory requires to use a smoothed
policy p¯i with added Gaussian noise σ. In Section 4, we have reported SA-DDPG performance
without adding σ. In this section, we present results with noise σ ∼ N (0, 0.1) for smoothed DDPG
policies. Table 6 shows the results. We can observe that clean performance of the smoothed DDPG
policies slightly drops while the robustness (reward under attacks) can be slightly better than the
non-smoothed policies in most settings.
I.3 Robustness Certificates
We report robustness certificates for SA-DQN in Table 3. As discussed in section E, for DQN we can
guarantee that an action does not change under bounded adversarial noise. In Table 3, the “Action
Cert. Rate” is the ratio of actions that does not change under any `∞ norm bounded noise. In some
settings, we find that 100% of the actions are guaranteed to be unchanged (e.g., the Pong environment
in Table 3). In that case, we can in fact also certify that the accumulated reward is not changed given
the specific initial conditions for testing.
In SA-DDPG, we can obtain robustness certificates that give bounds on actions in the presence of
bounded perturbation on state inputs. Given an input state s, we use convex relaxations of neural
networks to obtain the upper and lower bounds for each action: li(s) ≤ pii(sˆ) ≤ ui(s),∀sˆ ∈ B(s).
We consider the following certificates on pi(s): the average output range ‖u(s)−l(s)‖1|A| which reflect the
tightness of bounds, and the `2 distance. Note that bounds on other `p norms can also be computed
given li(s) and ui(s). Since the action space is normalized within [−1, 1], the worst case output
range is 2. We report both certificates for all five environments in Table 8. DDPG without our
robust regularizer usually cannot obtain non-vacuous certificates (range is close to 2). SA-DDPG
can provide robustness certificates (bounded inputs guarantee bounded outputs). We include some
discussions on these certificates in Section E.
For SA-PPO, since the action follows a Gaussian policy, we can upper bound its KL-divergence
under state perturbations. The results are shown in Table 9.
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Environment Ant Hopper Inverted Pendulum Reacher Walker2d
 0.2 0.075 0.5 1.5 0.15
State Space 111 11 4 11 17
Vanilla
DDPG
Natural Reward 1633 ± 631 3180 ± 390 1000 ± 0 -4.4 ± 1.6 2247 ± 1177
Critic Attack 337 ± 299 2112 ± 903 1000 ± 0 -25.1 ± 4.9 1193 ± 1252
Random Attack 1277 ± 704 2903 ± 736 1000 ± 0 -8.35 ± 2.43 1764 ± 1152
MAD Attack 199 ± 225 1396 ± 809 315 ± 243 -27.8 ± 5.83 1557 ± 1372
RS Attack 368 ± 346 704 ± 228 1000 ± 0 -17.1 ± 3.76 711 ± 663
RS+MAD 257 ± 247 783 ± 610 285 ± 232 -27.94 ± 5.47 1057 ± 1028
Best Attack 199 704 285 -27.85 711
DDPG with
adv. training
(50% steps)
Pattanaik et al.
[43]
Natural Reward 715 ± 265 3010 ± 460 1000 ± 0 -4.79 ± 1.49 1029 ± 316
Critic Attack 393 ± 290 1396 ± 1001 336 ± 280 -28.95 ± 5.1 103 ± 118
Random Attack 665 ± 295 2920 ± 624 966 ± 146 -8.86 ± 2.4 703 ± 548
MAD Attack 304 ± 284 1872 ± 1338 106 ± 81 -32.13 ± 6.56 172 ± 165
RS Attack 160 ± 301 13.8 ± 3.4 154 ± 49 -16.9 ± 2.6 261 ± 371
RS+MAD 333 ± 247 14.7 ± 3.6 199 ± 209 -32.4 ± 6.2 111 ± 91
Best Attack 160 13.8 106 -32.4 103
DDPG with
adv. training
(100% steps)
Pattanaik et al.
[43]
Natural Reward 63.8 ± 79 2680 ± 810 1000 ± 0 -5.97 ± 2.39 1242 ± 254
Critic Attack 1.2 ± 32.6 2562 ± 797 983 ± 93 -28.6 ± 4.6 118 ± 148
Random Attack 81 ± 79.7 2800 ± 437 1000 ± 0 -10.2 ± 2.7 957 ± 619
MAD Attack -14.9 ± 28 2731 ± 679 410 ± 302 -31.15 ± 4.7 128 ± 191
RS Attack -65 ± 91.6 1778 ± 577 1000 ± 0 -21.3 ± 4 41.7 ± 20.1
RS+MAD -57.5 ± 71 413 ± 552 345 ± 290 -31.3 ± 4.6 115 ± 157
Best Attack -57.5 413 345 -31.3 41.7
SA-DDPG
solved by
SGLD
Natural Reward 1503 ± 502 3035 ± 4.34 1000 ± 0 -5.2 ± 1.64 2760 ± 1563
Critic Attack 1294 ± 540 3069 ± 69.5 1000 ± 0 -11.7 ± 5.13 817 ± 747
Random Attack 1519 ± 405 3026 ± 11.5 1000 ± 0 -11.7 ± 4.86 2923 ± 1443
MAD Attack 1251 ± 543 2933 ± 287 1000 ± 0 -11.9 ± 5.23 2304 ± 1729
RS Attack 1371 ± 351 2564 ± 562 1000 ± 0 -11.2 ± 5.16 838 ± 1275
RS+MAD 1289 ± 423 2537 ± 745 1000 ± 0 -11.87 ± 5.21 1365 ± 682
Best Attack 1251 2537 1000 -11.9 817
SA-DDPG
solved by
convex
relaxations
Natural Reward 2111 ± 159 3496 ± 30.8 1000 ± 0 -5.222 ± 2.12 4234 ± 854
Critic Attack 1959 ± 105 3162 ± 829 1000 ± 0 -12.7 ± 4.5 1945 ± 1143
Random Attack 2051 ± 377 3490 ± 44 1000 ± 0 -9.77 ± 4.75 3659 ± 1279
MAD Attack 2070 ± 167 3403 ± 342 1000 ± 0 -12.8 ± 4.5 2900 ± 1511
RS Attack 2011 ± 108 1722 ± 599 1000 ± 0 -13.6 ± 3.64 2207 ± 1266
RS+MAD 1995 ± 301 1604 ± 589 878 ± 279 -13.9 ± 3.8 3199 ± 1482
Best Attack 1959 1722 878 -13.9 1945
Table 7: Rewards on 5 Mujoco environments using policies trained by DDPG and SA-DDPG. Natural
reward is the reward in clean environment without adversarial attacks. The “Best Attack” rows report
the lowest reward over all four attacks (representing the strongest attack), and this lowest reward is
used for robustness evaluation.
Table 8: Robustness certificates on bounded action changes under bounded state perturbations for
DDPG models. Results are averaged over 50 episodes. A smaller number is better. A vanilla DDPG
model typically cannot provide non-vacuous robustness guarantees.
Model Ant Hopper InvertedPendulum Reacher Walker2d
Certificates (`2 upper bound)
SA-DDPG (Convex) 0.129 0.285 0.040 0.207 0.563
DDPG (vanilla) 4.169 2.453 1.033 1.493 4.504
Certificates (`1 upper bound)
SA-DDPG (Convex) 0.328 0.404 0.040 0.290 1.095
DDPG (vanilla) 11.625 3.985 1.033 2.111 10.875
Certificates (`∞ upper bound)
SA-DDPG (Convex) 0.076 0.243 0.040 0.162 0.414
DDPG (vanilla) 1.813 1.746 1.033 1.075 1.999
Certificates (Range) SA-DDPG (Convex) 0.041 0.135 0.040 0.145 0.182DDPG (vanilla) 1.453 1.328 1.033 1.055 1.812
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Table 9: Upper bound on KL-divergence DKL(pi(a|s)‖pi(a|sˆ)) for three PPO environments. A smaller
number is better. Surprisingly, a vanilla trained Hopper and Walker2d models already have relatively
smaller upper bound on KL-divergence (but still larger than SA-PPO). However, for Humanoid our
SA-PPO can reduce this upper bound significantly.
Model Hopper Walker2d Humanoid
Certificates (KL upper bound) SA-PPO (Convex) 5.0013 0.8201 2.0414PPO (vanilla) 8.1455 1.4210 403.05
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